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A THIRD DEFENCE OF Dr. *Clarke*'s DEMONSTRATION OF THE *Being and Attributes of* GOD.

BEING A

VINDICATION OF THE Two Former DEFENCES,

In ANSWER to a Pamphlet, entitled,

Dr. Clarke's *Notions of Space examin'd*, &c.

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THE PREFACE.

I *HAD wholly laid aſide all Thoughts of troubling the World with any Thing more of this Kind, till I ſaw a little Piece, entitled,* Dr. *Clarke's* Notions of Space examined, &c. *Which, upon Account of ſome ingenious Objections I met with in it, and the Character I found it had got amongſt many learned Men at* Cambridge, *induced me once more to defend* Dr. Clarke's *Notions, and to vindicate my own.*

The Reaſon of my putting my Name to this, which I did not to my former Defences, is, becauſe I would not have any Perſon ſuffer upon my Account; for I find, in an Appendix *to a* Concio ad Clerum, *by* Dr. Gretton, *that he, as ſeems to be his Way, inſtead of anſwering the Argument, abuſes the ſuppoſed Author, in whom he will now find that he is quite miſtaken.* Dr. Gretton *is a Perſon*

Perſon, whom the late Dr. Clarke, *in his Life-time, always ſpoke of as ignorant of the firſt Principles of the Queſtion in Debate; for which Reaſon the Doctor never thought it worth his while to take any Notice of his* Review of the Argument a Priori; *and therefore till he ſhews the World, that he underſtands the Cauſe into which he forces himſelf, and can treat his Adverſaries with common Decency, I ſhall not think my ſelf obliged, neither would it be to any Purpoſe, to try to anſwer him.*

I have, in the following Defence, endeavour'd to treat the Author of Dr. Clarke's Notions, &c. *with all the Civility I could, as ingenious Authors always ought to be. I know that Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endleſs; and therefore I would not have the World expect to ſee any Reply to what may hereafter be publiſhed; unleſs Something new and very material ſhould be alledged againſt the Arguments in this, and my former Defences.*

A

VINDICATION

OF THE

FIRST DEFENCE.

SINCE the Publication of my former Defences of Dr. *Clarke*, there has appeared a Pamphlet, entitled, Dr. *Clarke's Notions of Space examin'd:* In which the Author has endeavoured to vindicate the Tranſlator of Archbiſhop *King's Origin of Evil*, in Anſwer to the fore-mentioned Defences. As there are in it many ingenious Objections, and ſome Sophiſtry, which may prevail equally with a great many Perſons; I think, I need not plead any Excuſe for ſending this Third Defence of Dr. *Clarke*'s Notions into the World.

THE Tranſlator of Dr. *King's Origin of Evil* had, in his Notes, laid down three Notions of Space: Firſt, the mere *Negation or Abſence of Matter*. Secondly, *The Extenſion of Body conſider'd abſtractly or ſeparate from any particular Body: As* Whiteneſs, *Without a* white Body. Thirdly, *As* a Subject *or* Subſtratum *of that ſame* Extenſion in Abſtracto. Theſe are the three Notions of the Tranſlator. The Abſurdity of which I had endeavoured to ſhew in my Firſt Defence: The Abſurdity of the Firſt I had endeavoured to ſhew from the Inſtances of the two Walls: Of the Second, from the Difference that there is between Whiteneſs and Space: And the Third, the Tranſlator conſider'd in his 16th Note; which was anſwer'd in its proper Place. In Anſwer to the Inſtance of the two Walls, this Author ſpends ten Pages to ſhew that I beg the Queſtion, by ſaying, That either there is no Difference between touching, and not touching; or elſe that That which is between them, when they do not touch, is really *Something*. This is a Disjunction, which ſeems to me no Way defective. Unleſs, therefore, he had proved, either that there wanted another Branch, or that there is no Difference between a Negative and an Affirmative; he has not proved againſt me. But he allows, that *if there was no Space between them, they would touch*; and yet nevertheleſs ſays, that *Space* is *Nothing*. If this is the Truth of the Caſe,

let

let us put *Nothing* for *Space*, in the foregoing Sentence, and then ſee what Senſe it will make. "If there was no *Nothing* between them, they "would touch;" that is, if there was *Something* between them, they would touch; but when there is any Thing between them, they do not touch: Therefore they do touch, and do not touch, at the ſame Time. But to come to Particulars. He ſays, Firſt, "That "though it be neceſſary to two Bodies "*touching*, that *Nothing* ſhould be between "them; yet it does not follow to their *not* "*touching*, it is neceſſary that ſomething "ſhould be between them." *Pag.* 7. If the latter Part of this Sentence is true, where is the Difference between touching and not touching? For in each Caſe, there is ſuppoſed to be *Nothing* between them; and whether they touch, or no, there is nothing more or leſs in the Bodies themſelves. Now, can *nothing* conſtitute a Difference between two Somethings? According to this Author, it can; becauſe he grants, that there is a Difference; and ſays alſo, that *Space is ſufficient to conſtitute that Difference*; and yet *Space*, according to him, is *Nothing*. But ſure, *Nothing* is that of which nothing can truly be affirm'd, and of which, every Thing may truly be denied: The Difference, therefore, that is conſtituted by nothing, may truly be ſaid to be no Difference: *Ergo*, there may be a Difference, and no Dif-

ference, in the ſame Things at the ſame Time. "Secondly," anſwers he again, "He ſuppoſes "the very Point to be proved: For he firſt, "in his own Mind, ſuppoſes SPACE to be a "*Thing*; and then ſays, that when two Bodies "do not touch, and all Matter be removed "from between them; becauſe there is SPACE "between them, or they muſt touch, there- "fore there is *Something* between them, or "they muſt touch: But this is *ipſiſſima* "*Quæſtio*: For, if we ſuppoſe all Mat- "ter, which was between the two Walls, that "did not touch, to be taken away; there is "no Neceſſity that Some-*Thing* muſt remain "between them, or they would touch." Before I give any Anſwer to this, or proceed any farther, it is very needful, to put our Author in Mind of that common and neceſſary Diviſion or Diſtinction of Things made uſe of by *Logicians, viz.* into *Genus* and *Species*; the not conſidering which, ſeems to be what led him into the Miſtake, which runs through his whole Book. The Words *Thing*, *Something*, *Being*, or the like, are uſed to ſignify the *Genus*, or are general and univerſal Terms, comprehending all Things whatſoever under them, whether they be Subſtances, Properties, or Relations, *&c.* This *firſt Genus* comprehended under the Name *Thing*, is divided into two *Species*, *viz.* Subſtance and Property. So likewiſe Subſtance, being conſider'd as a *Genus*, is alſo divided into two *Species*,

Species, *viz.* Body and Spirit, or material and immaterial Subſtances. And the Term Property, conſider'd as a *Genus*, is divided into two *Species*, namely, eſſential and common. Theſe are all the Diviſions that are neceſſary to our preſent Queſtion. The whole Difficulty to this Gentleman ſeems, by his forecited Paragraph, to be our calling SPACE *Something*; becauſe he from thence ſuppoſes that it muſt, if it is Something, be either Body or Spirit. But if the foregoing Diviſion is right, (as all Logicians confeſs it to be,) then I ſay, that there cannot poſſibly be any Abſurdity in calling Space Something. It is very certain, that every *Species* can be affirm'd of its *Genus*; that no *Genus* can be affirm'd of its *Species*; nor any one *Species* affirm'd of another. Thus, for inſtance, we can ſay that a Man is an Animal, becauſe *Man* is the *Species*, and *Animal* is the *Genus*; but we cannot ſay an Animal is a Man, becauſe it may as well be a Horſe, or any Creature upon the Earth, for they are all only different *Species* of the *Genus* Animal: Neither can we ſay a Man is a Horſe, becauſe it is affirming one Species of another; the Abſurdity of which appears at firſt Sight. But we can very properly ſay that SPACE is *Something*, becauſe it is only affirming a Species of its Genus. If this be well conſider'd, we ſhall ſee that the foregoing Diviſion is right, and that it is very proper

per to call Space Something, though it be no Subſtance; which is the chief Diſpute at preſent between this Gentleman and myſelf. We can ſay, without the leaſt Abſurdity, that a Subſtance is Something; but we cannot ſay, that Something is a Subſtance, becauſe then the former Aſſertion would not be true; for no Genus can be affirm'd of its Species, as I ſaid before. If then I affirm Space to be Something, does it thence follow that it is a Subſtance? Whoever ſays it does, talks very unlogically, and the ſame as he would do, who ſhould ſay, That becauſe a Man is an Animal, he is therefore a Horſe; the Caſe is the ſame in each. If we return to our Queſtion, and carry this Diſtinction along with us, we ſhall eaſily ſee the Fallacy of moſt of this Author's Arguments. What Ground has he to lay a *Petitio Principii* to my Charge, as he does in the forecited Paſſage? when I never affirm'd that there certainly was Something between the two Walls, when they did not touch; but only that there either was Something between them, or there was no Difference between a Negative and an Affirmative. If there is a Difference between touching, and not touching, and yet nothing between theſe two Bodies, what is the Difference? He tells us, "That "it is indeed very plain, that there muſt be "SPACE between them, or they would "touch; but we deny Space to be a Thing."

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That is, he denies Space to be a Thing, becauſe he affirms every *Thing* to be a Subſtance; or, in other Words, he affirms a Genus of its Species. But if the Space which is between the two Walls, and which conſtitutes the Difference betwixt their touching, or being at a Diſtance from each other, be, as he allows it is, *ſufficient* to conſtitute that Difference; then I ſay, That Space is really and truly *Something:* becauſe, *firſt*, here is Something poſitive affirm'd of it; *ſecondly*, there is a Difference where there would be none, if it was not Something. To ſay, that it is ſufficient to conſtitute a real Difference, and yet that it is Nothing, is to affirm Something of That, of which Nothing can be affirm'd; it is ſaying, that it is Something and Nothing at the ſame Time: And to ſay, that there is a Difference in Something, namely, the touching, or not touching of the two Walls, by the Means of that, without which it is confeſs'd there would be no Difference at all; and yet that that Thing is Nothing; is ſaying, that there is a Difference where there is no Difference, or that there is a Difference and no Difference in the ſame Thing at the ſame Time. It will be uſeleſs to take particular Notice of all that is ſaid in the 8th and 9th *Pages*. The Sum of his Argument ſeems to be this; That if two Bodies, which are ſuppos'd to be at a Diſtance, be ſo much increas'd, as to touch one another; then he concludes,

concludes, that that Space which was between the two Bodies before they touch'd, is now either removed, or annihilated, or elſe it is between them ſtill: But as he does not think, that I will allow the Space that was between the two Bodies, to be either removed or annihilated; in which he is in the right; therefore, ſays he, it muſt be between them ſtill. So that two Bodies touch, and yet there is Space between them, *i. e.* they do touch, and do not touch, at the ſame Time. This is a mere Quibble upon the Words *between the Bodies:* And I anſwer to it, That the Space that was between the Bodies before they touch'd, is now when they do touch, neither removed from between them, nor annihilated; neither is it between the two Bodies ſtill, but it is juſt where it was; only with this Difference, that as it was before between the Bodies, it is now penetrated by the Increaſe of the Bodies. If we try the Inſtance with Bodies of a known Bigneſs and Diſtance, the Fallacy of this Argument will the more eaſily appear: Let there be two Bodies, each of them a Yard Cube, and let them be placed at a Yard Diſtance from each other; and let us alſo ſuppoſe all Matter to be taken from between them, that is, let us ſuppoſe a cubick Yard of empty Space between them. If theſe two Bodies be crouded together, ſo as that their two Superficies facing each other touch, and any Perſon ſhould

ſhould ask what was become of the cubick Yard of Space that was between them; I would anſwer, That it was neither removed, nor annihilated, but that it is now where the two internal half-cubick Yards of the Bodies are; and that, as before the Removal of the two Bodies, the Space was between them, that is, between the internal Superficies of each Body; it is not now between the two whole Bodies, but only between the two external half-cubick Yards, and penetrated by the two internal half-cubick Yards of the Bodies. "Now, ſays he, from our ſuppoſing SPACE "to be nothing but the *Abſence* of *Matter*, "no ſuch Abſurdities will follow; for when "two Bodies do not touch, and there is on-"ly SPACE between them, we ſay there is "nothing between them. — Let their Ex-"tremities be extended till they touch, and "there is ſtill, we ſay, nothing between "them, *&c.*" *pag.* 10. If we conſider this Paſſage, we ſhall ſee, that what he before (*pag.* 9.) applies to me, of proving that there is no Difference between touching and not touching, may be much more juſtly turn'd upon himſelf. If Space is really Nothing, then Nothing may be Space. I hope the Author will not deny this: If then Nothing be Space, I beg Leave to repeat the preceding Paſſage of this Author, and put the Word Space inſtead of the Word Nothing; for he allows, that all we can af-

firm of Space, we may affirm of Nothing; and therefore what we can affirm of Nothing, we may affirm of Space. Let us then try the Paſſage in that Manner, and ſee what it will prove. "When two Bodies do "not touch, and there is only *Nothing* be- "tween them, we ſay there is Space be- "tween them. --- Let their Extremities be "extended till they touch, and there is ſtill, "we ſay, *Space* between them." That is, when the two Bodies do touch, there is Space between them; and when they do not touch, there is alſo Space between them: Where therefore can the Difference be between touching, and not touching? And will it not alſo follow, that they do touch, and do not touch, at the ſame Time? For when there is Space between two Bodies, thoſe Bodies cannot touch; but here are two Bodies that do touch with Space between them; that is, there is Space between them, and there is not Space between them; they do touch, and they do not touch. Let the Author take the foregoing Words in whatever Senſe he pleaſes, if they can be put as I have alter'd them, then it is very plain, that there is no Difference, where he grants there is a Difference: If the Words cannot be ſo alter'd, then it is moſt manifeſt, that Space cannot poſſibly be Nothing, that is, it muſt certainly be Something. If this Gentleman has found out a Thing that is between Nothing

thing and Something, which exiſts, but does not really exiſt, which ſeems to be his Notion of Space; if he will tell me what ſort of a Thing that is, which is neither Something nor Nothing, and can ſhew me the Difference between the real and not real Exiſtence of that which has ſome Exiſtence; I ſhall be very ready to give up the whole Diſpute. I ſaid in my firſt Defence, when I aſſerted Space to be Something, that *I would not be underſtood by Thing, to mean a Subſtance,* &c. "I doubt then, anſwers he, "he will find it pretty difficult to be underſtood at all; for if it be a *Thing exiſting*, and yet not a *Subſtance*, then it is a "Thing that is neither *Body* nor *Spirit*, &c." *Pag.* 11. I need not trouble the Reader with any more of this Page. It ſeems very odd, that any Perſon ſhould try to exclude *Properties* from coming under the *Genus*, comprehended in the Word *Thing:* Would any one ſay, that becauſe Knowledge is not a Subſtance, it is therefore Nothing? If it is really Nothing, where is the Difference between a wiſe and an ignorant Man, when by the Suppoſition there is nothing more in the one than in the other? And how can a Perſon affirm, that a Wiſe Man is ſuperior to a Fool, when the diſtinguiſhing Properties belonging to each of them are Nothing? I dare ſay, that this Author will not allow Knowledge to be either *Body* or *Spirit*, and

yet it muſt certainly be Something; for were it Nothing, we could truly deny every Thing of it, and then there could be no Difference between a Perſon's having, or not having it. There is no Way to eſcape this Rock, without ſailing between Something and Nothing, without imagining that Knowledge may be Nothing, and yet that Something may be affirm'd of it; which is the ſame as to ſuppoſe it Nothing and Something at the ſame Time. The Gentleman, I think, had no Reaſon to be ſo deſirous to be told what Space is, ſuppoſing it to be neither Body nor Spirit: I had often enough ſaid in my firſt Defence, that it was a *Property*, and the Abſurdity of calling a Property Nothing, I had ſhewn in my ſecond Defence. There is no Neceſſity therefore to ſteer any Courſe between Body and Spirit, when I can ſo eaſily go wide of them both. But to proceed: I had ſaid, that *if there remain'd Nothing between the two Walls, when the Matter was taken away, and yet they did not touch, there was then no Difference between touching, and not touching, but in the meer Words.*

" Here again, replies he, is the ſame ſort of " Fallacy which runs through the whole " Argument; and therefore it requires the " ſame ſort of Anſwer. — He ſuppoſes the " Difference of touching, and not touching " of two Bodies, to conſiſt meerly in the " Exiſtence *of Something real between them*,

" whereas

" whereas I think it does not. *Pure* SPACE, " without ſuppoſing it to be any *Thing exiſt-* " *ing*, but only a *meer Void*, being in my " Opinion ſufficient to conſtitute that Diffe- " rence." *pag.* 14. *Something real* muſt, I think, either mean a Subſtance; and then we are agreed; for neither of us ſuppoſe that there muſt be a Subſtance between the two Bodies, when they do not touch, or that elſe there would be no Difference between touching, and not touching; or he muſt mean, that there are ſome ſort of Things that are not real, and yet are not Nothings. If this be his Meaning, give me leave to repeat the latter Part of the laſt Paſſage, and to put the Word *Nothing* in the room of the Word *Space*, and then we ſhall ſee, where the Difference he talks of will be. " *Pure* " NOTHING, without ſuppoſing it to be any " *Thing exiſting*, but only a *meer void* " [*Nothing*,] being in my Opinion ſufficient " to conſtitute that Difference." I ſhall ſet down the next Paſſage of this Author, becauſe it ſeems to be making Space Something, at the ſame Time that he calls it Nothing. " Although therefore, when two Bo- " dies touch, and when they do not touch, " (if all Matter be remov'd from between,) " there is in both Caſes *Nothing* between " them; yet it does not follow, that there is " no Difference between touching, and not " touching: That they do not differ in this

" reſpect

" reſpect, is very true; but they do differ in " there being, or not being SPACE between " them: yet it will not follow that SPACE " muſt be Something really exiſting." *pag.* 15. I confeſs I do not clearly underſtand this Paſſage: He ſeems to own that there is a Difference in there being, or not being Space between the two Bodies; and yet ſays that it does not therefore follow that Space is any Thing. I ſhould be very glad to ſee what the Difference is, if that which cauſes the Difference be Nothing. The Caſe is this, if we put the Sentence here as we did the former, " That they do differ " in there being, or not being *Nothing* be- " tween them." That is, the *Nothing* which is between them, is ſufficient to make that Difference; but in each Caſe, whether they do, or do not touch, there is Nothing between them; therefore they do differ, and do not differ, at the ſame Time. The Concluſion of my Argument he allows to be true: " But that, ſays he, which ſhould be his " *minor* Propoſition --- *But there is Some-* " *thing between them,* &c. has all-along " been deny'd; and is the very Point in " Queſtion." *pag.* 16. In this I muſt beg the Gentleman's Pardon; for my Argument was drawn up in the manner of a disjunctive Syllogiſm; and therefore I apprehend that he miſtakes the *minor* Propoſition, as I believe we ſhall ſee, if we repeat the Argument

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in a Syllogiſtick Form. *Either there is no Difference between touching and not touching; or when two Bodies do not touch, there muſt be Something between them. But there is a Difference between touching and not touching.* Ergo, *when two Bodies do not touch, there muſt be Something between them.* It is from this Syllogiſm very plain, that he has all-along granted the *minor* Propoſition, namely, that there is a Difference between touching and not touching. He grants alſo, that if there was no Space, that is Nothing at all, between two Bodies, they would certainly touch: What is this but granting the Disjunction, or the *major* Propoſition: And then he knows, that in theſe Syllogiſms the Concluſion can never be deny'd? By what he has ſaid I think it is very evident that he denies the whole Syllogiſm, and yet grants every Propoſition of it true. The Difference therefore between us ſeems now to be brought to a very narrow Compaſs, and is no more than this: Whether it does not follow, from there being a Difference between touching, and not touching, as he grants there is; that when two Bodies do not touch, there muſt be Something between them. If this Gentleman can any Way ſhew the Difference which he allows, between touching and not touching, ſuppoſing two Bodies to have Nothing between them, and yet not to touch; he will then, and not till then prove what he has

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ſpent ſo many Pages here in trying to do.

We come now to the ſecond Suppoſition of the Tranſlator, namely, that the Notion he frames of *Space*, is "as the Extenſion of "*Body*, conſider'd *abſtractly*, or ſeparate "from any particular Body; as *Whiteneſs* "without a *White Body*, &c." In anſwer to this I had endeavour'd to ſhew the Difference between *Whiteneſs* and *Space*. But our Author takes me up, and ſays; That "it is very true, that *Whiteneſs* conſider'd "abſtractly without a white Body, is not "the ſame, but widely different from SPACE "conſider'd abſtractly without Body or Mat-"ter; *i. e.* that *Whiteneſs* is not Space." But here I deſire to obſerve, that this Gentleman's Reaſoning will prove *Whiteneſs* to be *Space*, contrary to what he expects; for if Whiteneſs be Nothing, and Space alſo be Nothing, Whiteneſs is Space; it being as impoſſible that two Things ſhould be a Third, without being one another, as that two Things ſhould be equal to a third, without being equal to one another. However he proceeds, and ſays, that "Whiteneſs and Ex-"tenſion are both abſtract Ideas, which can-"not ſubſiſt of themſelves, *&c.*" *pag.* 18. Here then is the Difference between us, he denies that Space is any Thing but an abſtract Idea; and I aſſert it not to be an abſtract Idea; and I believe, if we conſider the Nature of abſtract Ideas, we ſhall find it true.

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For an abſtract Idea is an Idea of a Quality in Bodies, without conſidering it as inhering in any particular Body. Thus, in the Inſtance before us, *Whiteneſs* is an *Idea* of a particular Appearance or Quality of a Body, the Appearance or Quality not conſider'd as belonging to any particular Body. Now this Author grants that *Whiteneſs* can have no Subſiſtence of it ſelf: Does he not mean by it, that though we can have an Idea of Whiteneſs without any particular white Body, yet that we cannot have the Idea of Whiteneſs without any Body at all? Let any Perſon try, whether he can frame to himſelf an Idea of a white Nothing: If he can, then I think Whiteneſs may ſubſiſt of itſelf; for we cannot have an Idea of that, of the Being of which there is no Poſſibility. We cannot have an Idea of a Thing's being and not being at the ſame Time, becauſe it is impoſſible; yet could we have ſuch an Idea, it would follow then, that it was poſſible, and conſequently might be. So if we could have an Idea of Whiteneſs, without any Body at all; it would follow that Whiteneſs might ſubſiſt of itſelf independent of Body. If our Author cannot have an Idea of a white Nobody, the Difference between Whiteneſs and Space will then be very plain. For I appeal to any Man, whether he cannot have an Idea of Space without any Body, or material Subſtance at all; nay, I appeal to this

Author himſelf, who ſays the Ideas of Extenſion and Body are ſo diſtinct: Let him ſay, in the forementionʼd Inſtance of two Bodies, that are diſtant from each other without having any Matter between them, whether he has not an Idea of Space between the two Bodies; and let him alſo ſay, whether he can poſſibly have any Idea of Whiteneſs between them, whilſt there is no Matter there. If he has the former, and not the latter, the Difference between them is moſt plain. It would be in vain to follow him through the two following Pages, *viz.* 19 and 20. concerning the Ideas being excited differently; ſince the Difference was not ſuppos'd to conſiſt in any different Excitement, but in the one's being diſtinct and ſeparate from Body, and in the other's being neceſſarily join'd with it. "Mr. *Locke*, he "ſays, gives Space the Denomination of "*Capacity.* Mr. *Wolaſton* calls *Penetrabi-* "*lity* an *Attribute* of SPACE; and the "Tranſlator, it muſt be confeſs'd, uſes the "Expreſſion of SPACE's having *ſome Pro-* "*perties; for inſtance*, Penetrability, *or a* "Capacity *of receiving Body*; but uſes it in "ſuch a Manner, as plainly ſhews he never "meant, nor ever thought SPACE to be "endued with any *poſitive Property.*" *P.* 23. The Author ſhould have explain'd what he means by a poſitive Property: Are there any Properties that are not poſitive? A Thing that

that is call'd a Property, muſt be either a Property, or not a Property; or is there Something between a Property and Nothing? as he ſeems to imagine Space to be I know not what, between Something and Nothing. I confeſs, I cannot frame to my ſelf any Idea at all of a Negative Property: If there are ſuch Things, I ſhall be oblig'd to this Gentleman, if he will ſhew me what ſort of a Thing a Negative Property is, and make appear the Difference between that and a Poſitive one. The Tranſlator argued, "That to ſay that "Space muſt have Exiſtence, becauſe it has "ſome *Properties*, for inſtance, *Penetra-* "*bility*, or a *Capacity* of receiving Body, "ſeems to me the ſame, as to urge, That "*Darkneſs* muſt be *Something*, becauſe it "has the Power and Property of receiving "Light, *&c.*" Theſe are the Tranſlator's own Words. But this Gentleman tells us, That he did not mean either that Space was a Capacity, or that Darkneſs was a Capacity, but only *that they were Suppoſitions alike ridiculous.* If this was really the Tranſlator's Meaning, to what Purpoſe did he ſay, in the Manner he did, that it did not from thence follow, that they muſt exiſt, or be Something? If any Perſon ſhould ſay, that becauſe I had a Pen in my Hand, it did not therefore follow that I was writing, any more than that I was walking, becauſe I had

Legs: Could any one imagine that the Perſon meant, that I had not a Pen in my Hand, or that I had no Legs? Sure he would much more naturally think, that the Perſon granted that I had a Pen in my Hand, or that I had Legs; yet denied the Conſequence, *viz.* that I was therefore writing or walking. Or if a Man ſhould tell me, that it did not follow, that becauſe Two and Two was Four, it was therefore Five: Does ſuch a Man mean, that Two and Two is not Four? If he can be ſo underſtood, I think we need not diſpute any longer about it. There ſeems to be no Occaſion to take Notice of all our Author has ſaid in the 27th *and* 28th *Pages;* for though he may deny Space to have any Attribute or Property, yet he has himſelf affirm'd Something of it, to wit, that it is ſufficient to conſtitute a Difference between Things; and therefore he cannot deny it to be Something. The Difference between a Poſitive and a Negative Property, which he lays ſo much ſtreſs on, I before own'd I did not underſtand; for they ſeem, each of them, from the Nature of our Language, capable of being put one for another. This ſeems to be the Caſe in the Inſtance this Author brings: Body is endued with a poſitive Property of excluding other Bodies; but it is a negative Expreſſion to ſay, that it is not capable, or has not a Capacity, of receiving other

other Bodies into its Place. But by the way we may obſerve, from what he has ſaid in the 28th Page, that either Space muſt be really Something, or elſe that he talks downright Contradictions and Nonſenſe: *It is*, he ſays, *a* Property *of one* Body *to exclude another*. I ask then, From whence? His Anſwer, I ſuppoſe, will be, From the ſame Place, from that Place in which the other exiſts. I ask again, What is Place? Why, I ſuppoſe he will ſay, A Part of Space. What then is Space? Here, I know, he will anſwer, Nothing. If therefore Space be Nothing, Place, which is only a Part of Nothing, muſt be Nothing too; ſo that when one Body has the Property of excluding another, it has the Property of excluding it from Nothing, or from No-where; that is, it has the Property of excluding it, and it has not at the ſame Time. If it be ſaid, That the Place is Something whilſt the Body is there, and not elſe; I ask, What is become of it when the Body is remov'd? It muſt either be where it was before, or be annihilated, or go along with the Body. If it is where it was before, then it is as much Something when the Body is not there, as when it is there: If it be annihilated, then when another Body goes into the Place where the former was, the former Body, by going away annihilated this Space; and the latter Body, by coming there, produced it again:

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If it goes along with the Body, then the Body will be in the ſame Place when it is in a different Place. Theſe two laſt Notions I think are ſufficiently abſurd. That we may have poſitive Ideas from Privations or Privative Cauſes, is very true; and had this ingenious Gentleman ſufficiently conſider'd the Nature of thoſe Ideas, I believe he would hardly have argued about them in the Manner he does. The Idea ariſing from a Privation, is not an Idea of the meer Abſence of the Thing only, for that would be an Idea of Nothing; but it is an Idea of a Place, in which the Thing was without that Thing. I have a poſitive Idea of a Dog: Now ſuppoſe, by any Accident, all the Dogs in the World were dead; would this Author ſay, that he had a poſitive Idea of no Dog? Or what would the Idea of the Real or Suppos'd Abſence of all Dogs be? I appeal to himſelf, whether it would not be an Idea of ſome Place, without a Dog, where he had either ſeen or ſuppos'd a Dog to be. If he ſays, It would not, but that he has a real poſitive Idea of no Dog; then I ſay, That all Ideas whatever, ariſing from Privations muſt be Nothing, becauſe they muſt be all alike; for an Idea of no Dog, cannot be different from an Idea of no Horſe. If he ſays it can, I ſhould be very much oblig'd to him, if he will ſhew me the Difference. It is, I think, very plain, that the Idea of the

the Abſence of Something muſt be the Idea of Nothing; becauſe it muſt be either an Idea of Something, or of Nothing; but it is not the Idea of Something, becauſe then it could not be the Idea of the Abſence of Something; therefore it is an Idea of Nothing. Now all Creatures, nay, any external Subſtance, from whence any poſitive Ideas ariſe, are all Something; and therefore an Idea of the Abſence of any of them, muſt be an Idea of Nothing. I think therefore it is incumbent upon this Author, ſince he has an Idea of Nothing, and of different Nothings, to tell us what ſort of an Idea it is, and how the Ideas of different Nothings are diſtinguiſh'd amongſt one another, and wherein they differ from other Ideas. The Ideas of Heat and Cold, *&c.* as he quotes from Mr. *Locke*, *Pag.* 29. are both poſitive Ideas; and in the next Page he quotes another Paſſage from the ſame Author, which explains the whole Difficulty. The Quotation is this: "That all Senſation being pro-
"duced in us, only by different Degrees
"and Modes of Motion in our animal Spi-
"rits, variouſly agitated by external Ob-
"jects, the Abatement of any former Mo-
"tion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new
"Senſation, as the Variation or Increaſe of
"it; and ſo introduce a new *Idea*, which
"depends only on a different Motion of
"the Animal Spirits in that Organ." *Hum.*

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Underſtand. B. II. c. viii. § 4. If Ideas depend upon the Motion of the Animal Spirits, as Mr. *Locke*'s Notion is; then I ſay, that when there is no Motion at all of the Animal Spirits, there can be no Idea ariſing from thence. The Privation therefore of any Thing cannot of itſelf produce a new poſitive Idea. If Ideas do not depend upon the Motion of the Animal Spirits, to what Purpoſe did the Author quote this Paſſage from Mr. *Locke.* He ſeems to have intended to prove from it, That we might have a poſitive Idea of a Privation, or rather of Nothing; but, I think, it appears from thence, that we cannot any ways have ſuch an Idea: For the New Idea, which is ſaid to ariſe from a Diminution of the Motion of the Animal Spirits, is not cauſed by that Part of the Motion which is taken away, but by that Part of it which remains. Thus if any Perſon ſtrikes me, I have immediately the Idea of Pain; if he ſtrikes me with leſs Force, I have then another new Idea; but this new Idea does not ariſe from the Quantity of Force, by which the former exceeded the latter, but from the latter Force, which was a Force by itſelf, diſtinct from the former Force. But if the Perſon does not ſtrike me at all, have I the poſitive Idea of no Pain? Surely I have no Idea at all about it. I know of no Privation that we can have an Idea of merely as the Abſence of

of the Thing, he inſtances, in the Caſe of Darkneſs, which is a Privation of Light. To which I ſay, That no Man can have an Idea of Darkneſs no where; for if he can have ſuch an Idea, what is the Difference between ſuch an Idea, and no Idea of Darkneſs at all? If he can have no ſuch Idea, then his Idea of Darkneſs is an Idea of Darkneſs ſomewhere; that is, a poſitive Idea of a Place without Light. The Truth I believe is, that we are ſo very converſant with *Place, Space,* &c. that when any Thing, by being taken away, cauſes a privative Idea, we conſider it only as the Abſence of the Thing, without conſidering the Place. But if we try to find out the Nature of ſuch an Idea, we ſhall ſee that we cannot frame to our ſelves the Idea of any Privation at all, meerly as a Privation. If this be true, then it is impoſſible for us to have any ſimple Ideas from Nothing, contrary to what this Author aſſerts, *pag.* 30. And in my *Second Defence, pag.* 24. I had ſhewn the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing ſimple Ideas to be cauſed by Nothing.

Space is one uniform continued Thing, yet it has nevertheleſs aſſignable Parts, and, according to this Author's Quotation from the Tranſlator, *may have Things predicated of ſome of them, different from thoſe which may be predicated of others.* Thus I can ſay, that the Part of Space, which this World

exiſts in, is different from that Part in which the Sun exiſts. "But this, ſays our Author, "is altogether inconſiſtent with his own "Notion of *Simple, Uniform, Indiviſible* "SPACE, and applicable to Matter only." *Pag.* 31. I think the Gentleman ought to have ſhewn, that it is inconſiſtent with my Notion; or I may anſwer him in his own Words; "That if he is not reſolv'd to ſay, "that it *muſt* be ſo, whether he can prove "it, or no; we ſhall take the Freedom to "ſay, that it *muſt not*; or, at leaſt, that it "does not follow, from any Thing he has "ſaid, that it muſt." *pag.* 35. But to return to the Argument. "If it [Space] has "Parts, it muſt be *diviſible*; for the very "Notion of *Parts* implies *Diſcerpibility*: "To ſay that any Thing has Parts, and yet "that thoſe Parts are *inſeparable*, ſeems to "be near a Contradiction. I think the Ideas "of Extenſion and Indiviſibility are incom-"patible." *ibid.* This is a bare Aſſertion, and without any Colour of Proof. It is true, that whatever is not extended, ſuppoſing an unextended Subſtance poſſible to be, ſuch a Subſtance would be indiviſible; but it does not follow, that what is extended muſt be diviſible: I am ſure it is plainly otherwiſe in the Caſe of Space. However, I ſhall endeavour to give the Author an Idea of an extended indiviſible Thing; or at leaſt ſhew him, that the two Ideas of

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Extenſion and Indiviſibility are not incompatible. Let us ſuppoſe a Yard Cube of Matter free from all Pores, ſo that it ſhould be perfectly ſolid: ſuppoſe this Matter ſurrounded with Something, that ſhould hinder its being ſeparated into any Parts whatever; that is ſhould hinder the Body from taking more room: It is plain that this Matter is extended, and it cannot be divided; becauſe to divide it would be to croud the Parts, into which it is ſuppos'd to be divided, into themſelves. If we ſuppoſe this ſolid Matter to be infinite, it will be a tolerable Repreſentation of the Indiviſibility and Extenſion of Space. the Difference being only in this, That to ſeparate the Parts of Space, is both to croud thoſe Parts into one another, and to leave Space between; but to ſeparate the Parts of the Matter, is only to croud the Parts into one another; both which we ſee, from the Nature of each of them, is impoſſible. After he has aſſerted, that the two forementioned Ideas are incompatible, he proceeds, "I know the Reply to this is ready, "*viz.* Is not a *Spirit extended? And is it* "*not nevertheleſs indiviſible?* --- I anſwer, "That a Spirit is *indiviſible*, and for that "Reaſon *not extended:* For it is very ma- "nifeſt, that an *Indiviſible Being* cannot "admit of a *Diviſible Quality*, which *Ex-* "*tenſion* is, any more than a *Diviſible Be-* "*ing* can admit of an *Indiviſible Quality*;

" which is the Reaſon that no Syſtem of " Matter can be intelligent." *ibid.* It ſeems very odd, that theſe Gentlemen, who find out *Petitio Principii's* where there is none, cannot ſee their own, be they never ſo plain. Where has our Author prov'd Extenſion to be a diviſible Quality? And if he has not prov'd it, I muſt take the Liberty to ſay that it is not. A Spirit, he ſays, is *indiviſible*, and for that reaſon *not extended*. If he means by *Spirit* an immaterial Subſtance, then I ſay, that it may be queried whether it is indiviſible, or no, and ſtill the Argument againſt Matters thinking be equally concluſive; for the Reaſon why Matter is incapable of thinking, is not becauſe the Subſtance of it is diviſible, but becauſe it conſiſts of diſtinct ſeparate Parts, or rather of a diſtinct Number of whole Subſtances, and remains the ſame, as to its Eſſence, after any Diviſion, as it was before: Whereas a Spirit may be, for all this Gentleman can ſhew to the contrary, an extended diviſible Subſtance, though the Eſſence may be deſtroy'd by actually dividing it; and if it was before its Diviſion an intelligent Being, it may by ſuch a Diviſion become only ſeveral immaterial Subſtances. Thinking is an indiviſible Quality; and therefore no thinking Being can, as a thinking Being, be divided; that is, no thinking Being can be divided into a Number of thinking Beings, nor into a Number

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of Subſtances, that ſhould be altogether a thinking Being, as they were before the Diviſion: But a thinking Being may be divided, as an immaterial Subſtance, for all that I know, and the Power of Thinking be thereby deſtroy'd. All Authors that were for confuting the Notion of Matter's Capacity of thinking, always endeavour'd to prove the Impoſſibility of it, from its having ſo many diſtinct Percipients in it; that is, becauſe it conſiſted of an infinite Number of diſtinct whole Subſtances. I had aſſerted, That the two Ideas of Extenſion and Diviſibility *were as wide and diſtinct from one another as any two Ideas poſſibly could be, and that it was very plain from the Conſideration of the Nature of Space.* This, ſays our Author, is downright begging one of my Queſtions. I own, indeed, that it is a Conſequence of Space's being ſomething real; but is it therefore a *Petitio Principii?* Is every Propoſition, that is a Conſequence of ſome foregoing one, which foregoing one might not be ſufficiently prov'd, therefore a *Petitio Principii?* Can we ſay, if a Perſon has a Chain of Arguments, and the firſt Propoſition is not really and truly prov'd, that he therefore begs the Queſtion in them all? If we can, we need only deny a few Maxims, and then every Author that ever wrote any Mathematical Demonſtrations, may be ſaid to beg the Queſtion in every

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Propoſition. If I have not ſufficiently prov'd the Reality of Space, this is then a Conſequence which is not true; but if I have done that, then it is a true one: And whoever conſiders this Author's foregoing Objections againſt it, will not only ſee, that I had really demonſtrated it [Space] to be Something, but that he allows it, at the ſame Time that he is endeavouring to prove the contrary, by poſitively affirming ſomething of it; which ſurely no Perſon will be ſo abſurd, as to ſay can be affirm'd of Nothing. If there were no Space, (whether we can ſay *Parts* of Space, or no, which we certainly cannot in this Author's Senſe of the Word *Parts*, I ſhall now conſider,) into which a Body is to be extended, the extending Body cannot make that Something which was Nothing before. This, I find, our Author allows; but then replies he, "Neither is it any Thing, any "more than it was before: For where he "ſays, There were *Parts of* SPACE before; "I ſay, There was *Nothing* before but a "meer *Void*; and when the Body is exten-"ded into it, that *Void* becomes full: which "is all the Myſtery." *pag.* 34. Here he ſays, that the Body is extended into Space; but if Space be Nothing, then is the Body extended into Nothing. What therefore is the Difference between being extended into Nothing, [into No-where,] and not being extended at all? Should he reply, That to

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be extended into more Space, is only to become bigger; I anſwer, That it cannot become bigger, without taking up more Space. This he grants, "That the bigger any Body "is, the more SPACE it requires for its "Exiſtence, is true." *P.* 61. But to take up more Nothing, is only the farther off Something: For as a Body which takes up Nothing, to extend itſelf farther into, will be of the ſame Size; ſo a Body which takes up more Nothing, to extend itſelf farther into, will, if any Thing, be leſs than it was before. But if all the Myſtery is, that Nothing becomes full, I beg this Author to tell me the Difference between the Fulneſs of Nothing, and no Fulneſs at all; that is, in his Senſe, no Body. If I am not miſtaken, Fulneſs is Poſitive, or elſe a Void is not negative: And if it is ſo, to ſay that Nothing becomes full, is to affirm Something of Nothing, it is to apply ſome real Quality to Nothing; which is a Contradiction: If the Author, in trying to ſhift off this Difficulty, ſhould deny what he before granted, and ſay, That it is the Body that is full, and not the Space in which it exiſts; I anſwer, That then *No-where*, or *No-place*, is fill'd with the Body; ſo that the Body exiſts No-where, that is, does exiſt, and does not, exiſt at the ſame Time.

I am ſorry to ſee ſo ingenious an Author, as this Gentleman ſeems to be, hold up an Argu-

Argument purely for the ſake of quibbling upon Words; for the two following Pages are nothing elſe but a meer Quibble upon the Word *Pre-exiſtence*; by which I meant no more than the Exiſtence of Space, before the Body, which is ſuppos'd to exiſt in it, does exiſt in it. If the Space, into which a Body is mov'd, is really Nothing before the Body is mov'd into it, then it is Nothing after the Body is mov'd into it; which our Author allows. Now if the Body, by being mov'd into this Space, be really mov'd into Nothing, or No-where, what is the Difference between Motion and Reſt?

I aſſerted, That *if there were no Diſtance exiſting really*, that is, if there were no ſuch Thing as Diſtance, *it would unavoidably follow, that the Sun and Moon exiſted, both in the ſame individual Place.* To this our Author replies, That "Diſtance is the ima-"ginary Length of SPACE, conſider'd be-"tween any two Beings." *pag.* 37. What is this but allowing the Conſequence I mention'd? For if the Diſtance of the Sun from the Moon be only imaginary, it cannot be real; therefore the Sun and Moon are really in the ſame Place, though they are in our Imagination at a Diſtance. But of the forecited Definition of Diſtance I obſerve farther, That if Diſtance be only the *imaginary* Length of Space, the Diſtance is only the *imaginary* Length of Nothing; but the

imaginary Length of Nothing, is really no imaginary Length at all; for to imagine a Quantity (as Length is) of Nothing, is imagining Nothing to be Something; which is a Contradiction in Terms. If then Diſtance is not an imaginary Length, the Sun and Moon do appear to be at no Diſtance, or in the ſame Place; and yet they do appear, we ſee, at a Diſtance at the ſame Time. I ſuppoſe the Author will grant, that Diſtance muſt be either a real or an imaginary Length; and how it can be an *imaginary* Length, we have now ſeen; and therefore the Conſequence is plain.

I ſuppoſe this Author means, by a real exiſting Being, a Subſtance, when he ſays, that "Though Diſtance be not a real exiſting Being, yet will it follow, nay, has it "the leaſt Colour of an Argument, that all "Bodies muſt exiſt in the ſame individual "Place?" I anſwer, Yes; unleſs he means only by Being, a Subſtance; and then indeed it will not follow: But if by Being he means only Something, that is, not Nothing, it is very evident that it muſt be ſo; for if all Beings do exiſt in Nothing, they do certainly exiſt all in the ſame Place, or rather in no Place at all. I ſhould be very well pleas'd to ſee the Difference between the ſeveral Nothings, in which ſeveral Bodies exiſt, if they do exiſt in Nothing, and yet exiſt all in different Places. Till this Au-

thor can ſhew the Difference I ask, I think I may very reaſonably believe, that all Bodies would exiſt in the ſame individual Place, if Space be not Something. After this, our Author quotes a Paſſage from Mr. *Locke*: I ſhall take notice of the latter Part of it, becauſe it has ſome relation to the preſent Queſtion about the Reality of Space. The Words are theſe: "That our Idea of Place "is nothing elſe, but ſuch a relative Poſition "of any Thing, as I have before mention'd, "I think is plain, and will be eaſily admit-"ted, when we conſider that we can have "no Idea of the Place of the Univerſe, "though we can of all the Parts of it; be-"cauſe beyond that we have not the Idea "of any fix'd, diſtinct, particular Beings, in "reference to which we can imagine it to "have any Relation of Diſtance, *&c.*" *Human Underſtanding*, B. II. c. xiii. § 10. By the Univerſe, Mr. *Locke* means all Matter that exiſts, or what we properly call the *Phœnomena* of Nature, and not Immenſity, and all Things contain'd therein; which is what we may, and often do mean by it. That Mr. *Locke* does not mean this, is plain, becauſe we can have no Idea, Image, or exact Repreſentation at all of Immenſity, becauſe it is infinitely greater than what can be contain'd in any of our Minds. Surely no Body can charge ſo Great a Man as Mr. *Locke* was, with ſuch an Abſurdity:

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Beſides, that he really does mean as I would underſtand him, appears from his own Words; for he ſays *beyond that*, *viz.* the Univerſe. Now if we underſtand by the Univerſe, Immenſity, then *beyond that* will mean, beyond that which has no End: But this is right-down Nonſenſe; and therefore Mr. *Locke* could mean nothing but the *Phænomena* of Nature, or the material World. And if he does, to what Purpoſe did this Gentleman quote this Paſſage, which ſeems to ſhew that Mr. *Locke* is of a different Opinion from him, in believing that the Space that was beyond the *Phænomena* of Nature to be really Something, as will appear preſently; for the *Phænomena* of Nature muſt be either infinite or finite: If infinite, the ſame Abſurdity will follow, from ſaying beyond the *Phænomena* of Nature, as from ſaying beyond Immenſity: If finite, then to ſay beyond the *Phænomena* of Nature, means either that there is Something beyond them, or elſe there is no Difference between Finity and Infinity, becauſe we can then in each Caſe ſay, that there is nothing beyond them. Our Idea of the Abſolute Place of any Thing, is an Idea of its Exiſtence in ſome Part of the Univerſe; but to know any Thing of its Situation with reſpect to the Univerſe, is impoſſible. Our Idea of the Relative Place of any Thing is, its Situation with reſpect to other Things; there can therefore

be no Relative Place without an Abſolute Place; for to ſuppoſe a Relative Place of any Thing, is to ſuppoſe that Thing to be ſomewhere; but that which has no Abſolute Place is no-where. The Sun and Moon therefore can have no Relative Poſition or Place, if they have no Poſition or Place at all; for to talk of the Relation of one Place to another, ſuppoſes that there is Place in general. But if Diſtance be in reality Nothing, there can be no Relative Place, any more than, according to him, any Abſolute Place; for if the Diſtance between two Bodies be Nothing, the Relation of Place ariſing from that Diſtance muſt be Nothing alſo: And this ſhews the Fallacy of what this Gentleman ſays, *pag.* 38, 39.

I ſhall not trouble the Reader with all our Author has ſaid, from *pag.* 39 to 42. The Sum of the Whole is, *Firſt*, That the Idea of Space ruſhing into our Minds, is no Proof of its Exiſtence, or that it is any Thing. *Secondly*, That if the Impoſſibility of ſuppoſing it away, is founded upon its being an Eſſential Attribute of the Self-exiſtent Being, it remains to be prov'd, that it is an Eſſential Attribute of the Self-exiſtent Being. I ſhall not conſider this, till I come to the two Demonſtrations of the Reality of Space. But firſt the Author ſays, That, allowing the Idea of Space to ruſh into our Minds, the Reaſon is, "becauſe we cannot ſuppoſe it

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" *annihilated;* and the Reaſon why we " cannot ſuppoſe it annihilated, is, becauſe " it is *Nothing.*" If after all Things, by which I now mean all created Subſtances, and their Properties, are ſuppos'd to be annihilated, this Author has an Idea of Nothing, which ruſhes into his Mind whether he will, or no; I ask, firſt, what ſort of an Idea it is? ſecondly, whether it be an Idea of Nothing *no-where*, or *ſome-where*? If no-where, then where is this Nothing of which he has an Idea. And how can that ruſh into his Mind which is no-where, and which conſequently can raiſe no Idea any-where? If it be ſomewhere, then his having of an Idea of Nothing ſome-where, has the ſame Signification, as his having an Idea of Something no-where, that is, his having no Idea at all. Beſides, if he can have an Idea of Nothing ſome-where, for the ſame Reaſon he may have an Idea of ſuch a Nothing every-where. This would be an Idea of an infinite Nothing; which implies two Contradictions, *viz.* an Idea of Nothing, and of Infinity apply'd to Nothing. If he ſhould ſay, that the Term *Infinite* being negative, may therefore be apply'd to Nothing, without a Contradiction; I anſwer, That an Idea of Nothing every-where, ſuppoſes an Idea of Nothing ſome-where; and an Idea of Nothing ſome-where only, is an Idea of a finite Nothing; and finite is poſitive, if in-

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finite is negative. I hope the Gentleman, by this Time ſees the Abſurdity of applying poſitive Qualities to nothing. He tells us a little farther, that "We have "ſuppoſed to be annihilated every Thing, "but the ſupreme Being, which had any "Exiſtence." This ſeems again to intimate, that he ſuppoſes ſome Things not to have any real Exiſtence, and yet not to be Nothings; but till the Nature of theſe ſort of Nothings are explained to me, I am unable to diſpute about them.

I ſaid that Dr. *Clarke*, in proving Space to be ſomething from its Qualities, *did not conſider it ſtrictly as a* Property, *but as its own* Subſtratum. This Sentence (had not I explained what I meant by it) might, indeed, have been underſtood in the Senſe this Gentleman takes it in; but conſidering how difficult it is to expreſs Things of this Nature clearly, it does not ſeem very fair, to take the Words in a Senſe contrary to what I had ſhewn I meant them in. If there are ſuch Qualities as we apply to Space, and if Properties cannot inhere in one another, (which I deſire this Author to ſhew the Abſurdity of, but for the preſent we will ſuppoſe they cannot;) then becauſe no Qualities can exiſt of themſelves, I ſay, that if theſe Qualities cannot be in any *Subſtratum*, without ſomething elſe, [Space ſuppoſe,] it equally proves the Reality of that Something, [Space,]

[Space,] as if those Qualities could be applied to it self. It will be to no purpose to give an Answer to all the Particulars in the three following Pages, *viz.* 43, 44, 45. I shall only produce one parallel Instance, to make the Case before us as plain as I can. Knowledge is a Property of some Being; this he grants Page 75. Now if we see that there are Qualities, which could not be without Knowledge; and if these Qualities cannot strictly and properly be said to be Qualities of Knowledge, but of some Being, it equally proves the Reality of Knowledge, and also that it is a Property of the Being, in which these Qualities are. Thus a Capacity of distinguishing betwixt Right and Wrong, Truth and Falshood, are Qualities accompanying Knowledge; if therefore we see these distinguishing Qualities in any Being, should we not immediately apply Knowledge to this Being, and conclude that it was a Property of this Being? So likewise in the Case before us: If we perceive that Something is penetrable, extended, *&c.* and that no Being could be so, except Space was Something; will it not most evidently follow, that Space is Something? and if it be a Property, that it is a Property of that Being? It may be here perhaps said, that all Substances are extended, *&c.* But then I answer, not in the same Manner; for they they are all penetrated by this Extension; whereas the infinite self-existent

exiſtent Being conſtitutes Extenſion. "To "ſay, that *Penetrability* is a Property of "the infinite Being, *i. e.* of GOD, is ſaying "that the infinite Being, *i. e.* GOD, *is pe-* "*netrable*; which is ſo apparently blaſphe- "mous, that it cannot, by any one be al- "lowed to be a Property of him." *Page* 46. God forbid! It greatly behoves this Author, to conſider upon whom this Accuſation of Blaſphemy will fall: For if, by a Being's being penetrable, can only be meant that ſuch a Being may have other Beings in it; (and whether it can poſſibly mean any Thing elſe, I appeal to all the World;) then let him remember whoſe the following Words are, *in him we live and move, and have our Being.* He brings an Inſtance, *Page* 47. to prove the foregoing Argument, *viz.* that Space is a Property of the infinite Being, fallacious: "GOD, ſays he, is *Om-* "*niſcient*; he could not be *omniſcient*, un- "leſs there were *Things* for him to *know*: "But does it from thence follow, that theſe "*knowable Things* are Properties of God?" This is by no means a parallel Caſe; for, firſt, knowable Things are not always Properties; ſecondly, *Omniſcience* may include *Pre-* *ſcience*, and *Preſcience* is knowing the Things that are poſſible to exiſt, before they actually do exiſt; and therefore thoſe Things that are to be, cannot be Properties before they are any Thing at all. The Argument ſhould

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have ſtood thus, and then let the Author judge whether it be concluſive, or no. An Impoſſibility of ever being deceived belongs to GOD; but without *Omniſcience*, this Impoſſibility of ever being deceived could not belong to God; therefore God is Omniſcient.

I confeſs Indiſcerpibility does not ſeem ſo immediately derived from Space; yet if we conſider it, we ſhall find, that it is impoſſible for a Being, to which Space does not belong as a Property, to be indiſcerpible; becauſe as Space is a neceſſarily exiſtent Property, there muſt be ſome Subſtance to which it belongs; and that Subſtance muſt be ſelf-exiſtent, and therefore ſuperior to all other Subſtances, and conſequently indiſcerpible.

The Difference between *Extenſion in its general Meaning*, and what the Tranſlator means by *Extenſion in Abſtracto*, is this: The former is the Extenſion of the infinite Being, and the latter only a Quality of Body, without ſuppoſing any particular Body.

We come now to conſider, whether Properties can inhere in one another. I ſhall not dwell upon it, but only tell the Author, that if he can ſhew me any Abſurdity in it, I ſhall very willingly give it up. I had ſaid, that *Penetrability*, *Immobility*, *Indiſcerpibility*, and *Infinity*, might be ſaid to be

Modes of Space, as well as all Kinds of Shapes be ſaid to be different Modes or Modifications of Figure. This our Author objects againſt, *Page* 49. but what he ſays is only raiſing a Diſpute about the Words *Figure* and *Shape*; but which-ever of them is the *Genus*, is nothing to our Purpoſe: Figure or Shape, let him take which he pleaſes for the Genus, in its general Meaning, is a Property of Finiteneſs, or of all finite Subſtances. Roundneſs or Squareneſs is a Quality of Figure or Shape, for it is a particular Shape; it is not a Quality of Body, becauſe it cannot be applied to all Bodies, but only to particular ones; it may therefore be juſtly called a Quality of Figure.

I aſſerted that what the Tranſlator quotes from *Epiſcopius*, as an Anſwer to Dr. *Clarke*'s Query, wanted Proof; this Gentleman therefore anſwers, that "Thoſe who ſay SPACE "is *Something*, are on the *Affirmative* Side "of the Queſtion; and thoſe who ſay it is "*Nothing*, on the *Negative*; I humbly ap- "prehend, that according to the known "Rules of Controverſy, it is incumbent on "the *former* to prove the *Affirmative*, and "not on the latter to prove the Negative." I agree with this Gentleman, that if two Perſons are in a Diſpute, and the one affirms Something, and the other denies it, it is incumbent upon him that affirms the Thing, to prove it. But this is not the Caſe here; for if a Perſon

ſon firſt ſuppoſes a Negative, and ſeveral Propoſitions depend upon this Suppoſition, as is the preſent Caſe, he is very juſtly ſaid to beg the Queſtion. If I had laid it down at the Beginning of this Treatiſe, that all Subſtances were Nothings, and if I had from thence ſhewn, that all our Author's Arguments were falſe; he might very rightly have ſaid, that I ſuppoſed a Thing that was to be proved; and it would have been very unreaſonable to have expected any other Anſwer.

THE TWO DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE Real EXISTENCE OF SPACE VINDICATED.

IN my firſt Defence of Dr. *Clarke*, I quoted the Doctor's Demonſtration of Space's being a Property, and I alſo added another Demonſtration to it: Theſe two the Author of Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notions*, &c. endeavours to confute. He begins with the Doctor's firſt Propoſition; which was, to prove Space not to be Nothing, from its having Quantity, Dimenſions, &c. becauſe *of Nothing there is no* Quantity, *no* Dimenſions, *no* Properties. " This is, indeed, ſays " our Author, alone that which ſhews *the*

" *Difference*

" *Difference between what exiſts, and what* " *does not.* Here will I hold; and let this " decide the Queſtion: If Space has really " either *Quantity*, *Dimenſions*, or *Proper-* " *ties*, I will readily give up the Diſpute " and own it to be *ſomething exiſting.*" *Page* 53. This is very fair; and he ſhall find me as ready to let the whole of the Diſpute turn upon this; for that which has neither Quantity, Dimenſions, nor Properties, moſt certainly can have Nothing affirmed of it, and will therefore be truly Nothing. But I fear this Gentleman has here brought himſelf into a Difficulty, which will not ſo eaſily be got out of. *Length*, *Diſtance*, and the like, are certainly *Quantity*. He tells us, *Pag.* 37. " That pure SPACE, without ſuppo- " ſing it to be any Thing really exiſting, " is ſufficient to conſtitute Diſtance." That is, *nothing* can have Quantity applied to it, and be of different Magnitudes. This Paſſage ſeems contrary to what he ſays here; but whoever reads his firſt Part of his Book attentively, will ſee that he is forced to affirm poſitive Things of this Space, which he calls Nothing, and to grant that it has Quantity. I ſhall now, therefore, only endeavour to ſhew the Reader that SPACE has *Quantity*, *Dimenſions*, and *Properties*, belonging to it. Firſt, It has *Quantity*, becauſe it has Length, which is Quantity. That it has Length is plain, for otherwiſe all Bodies

would

would be equal and alike; and if Length was not Quantity, all Bodies would be of the ſame Length. Secondly, It has *Dimenſions*; for Dimenſions are only Lengths every Way, or Length, Breadth and Depth. Thirdly, Its having Properties, has, I think, been ſufficiently ſhewn, and is unqueſtionable; unleſs this or ſome Author can ſhew the Impoſſibility of Properties inhering in one another; which is the only Objection, that I know of, to its having Properties affirmed of it. To affirm any Thing of Nothing, is the greateſt Abſurdity in the World; for it is, as it were, to make Nothing Something, and yet to let it be nothing ſtill: Yet as abſurd as it is, I fear this Author has been guilty of it; for he affirms Something of Space, and yet denies it to be any Thing.

To ſuppoſe Space the Property of Body only, as our Author does at the Bottom of this Page, is tending towards Atheiſm; and I imagine that it was this that led *Spinoſa* and others to think, that the material World was the ſelf-exiſtent Being; for if Space is the Property of Matter, and of Matter only, and if Space is infinite, and if it cannot be ſuppoſed not to be, that is, is neceſſarily exiſting; then the Subſtance of which it is a Property, muſt be neceſſarily exiſting, that is, Matter muſt be the ſelf-exiſtent Being.

The ſecond Propoſition of the Doctor's is, that Space is not a mere Idea; becauſe *no* Idea

Idea *of* SPACE *can poſſibly be framed greater than* Finite, *yet Reaſon ſhews that it muſt be* Infinite. This Propoſition depends upon the foregoing one; for if Space be Nothing, we need not diſpute whether it is an Idea, or no. This Author's firſt Anſwer to this Argument needs no Reply; his ſecond we will conſider: "It may indeed be true, ſays he, "that we cannot frame any Idea of SPACE "greater than *Finite*; but how does it "from hence follow, that SPACE cannot be a "*mere Idea?* He ſays, becauſe *Reaſon ſhews* "*that it muſt be Infinite.*

"In this Dr. *Clarke* may ſpeak for himſelf, but not for every Body; ſince there "are ſome, whoſe *Reaſon ſhews 'em*, that "*Infinity* cannot with any Senſe be applied "to SPACE, *&c.*" *Pag.* 55. Then he quotes two Paſſages from the Tranſlator, about our Faculty of enlarging the Extenſion of Body *in infinitum*. But in order to ſhew the Inſufficiency of this Anſwer, let us ſuppoſe Space to be nothing but the Poſſibility of Body's increaſing without End. By the Quotation it is plain, that he allows there can be no Bounds ſet to our Faculty of enlarging the Idea of Extenſion, or of Body extended; we *can ſuppoſe Matter infinitely expanded:* There muſt then be a Poſſibility of Matter's being made infinite; otherwiſe we ſuppoſe an Impoſſibility. If Space therefore be a Poſſibility of the Exiſtence of Matter,

ter, as he allows, and if there can be no Bounds ſet to this Poſſibility, it is evident that Space muſt be infinite. Whether Space be any Thing more than ſuch Poſſibility, has been ſhewn before, and will be, I hope, made quite manifeſt. I ſhall not trouble the Reader with what he has ſaid *pag.* 57. but only deſire him to take Notice of this; That if a Body can be increas'd as to its bulk, it muſt be increas'd *Somewhere*, that is, muſt reach into more Space; but if Space be Nothing, it would be increas'd *No-where*, i. e. it would be increas'd, and not increas'd, at the ſame Time. There will be no Neceſſity to proceed any farther in theſe Arguments, ſince we ſeem both agreed in the reſt of them; for whether Space be Quantity, or not, has been already conſider'd.

We come now to the Demonſtration I had annex'd to the Doctor's. The Firſt Propoſition was to prove, that Space is not Nothing; and the Argument was founded upon the Difference between Space and Duration, which conſiſts in theſe two Particulars; Firſt, *That every Part of* Space *exiſts at once; and no two Parts of* Duration *can be ſaid to exiſt at once.* Secondly, That *the bigger any Body is, the greater Part of* Space *it requires for its Exiſtence; whereas in* Duration *it takes up the ſame Part of it, whether it be great or ſmall.* Before I proceed, it may not be thought unneceſſary to ſhew

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the Difference between calling Space and Duration two Nothings, and ſaying, That there is Nothing here, or there, in this, or in that Part of the Room; becauſe this Author, I find, would make me affirm, that *Nothing* in this, in that, and in another Part of the Room, are three Nothings. But theſe three Nothings, which, he ſays, are, one in this, another in that, and a third in another Part of the Room, are only three *Places* without any Subſtances in them; for were they really Nothing, there could not be any Difference between 'em: The Place in one Part of the Room, would be the ſame individual Place as that of another Part of the Room, becauſe they are both Nothing, and muſt therefore be both each other. The Author, in anſwer to the two fore-mention'd Differences between Space and Duration, ſays, that I "talk of the Parts of Space before "I have prov'd either of them to *have* "*Parts*, or to *exiſt at all*." *Pag.* 61. I believe we ſhall find our Author guilty of the ſame Fault that he here lays to my Charge: For he tells us, that Space is ſufficient to conſtitute a Difference, where there would be none without it, as in the Inſtance of the two Walls. Now it is evident, that he could not mean that all Space, that that Space which is in quite another Part of the Univerſe, is ſufficient to conſtitute ſuch a Difference; or, that it has any Thing at all

to do with the Difference between two Things that are ſo far diſtant from it. I appeal to himſelf, whether he did not mean, by the Space that he affirms to be ſufficient to conſtitute a Difference between the touching, and not touching, of two Bodies, that Space that is between thoſe two Bodies? If he does mean that Space, then I deſire to know what that Space is; whether it is not a Part of the Space which is every where, that is, Immenſe Space? It is plain, that it muſt be be either the Whole, or a Part, or no Space at all: But he allows that it is Space; and we have ſeen that it cannot be all or immenſe Space, therefore it muſt be a Part of Space; and conſequently this Author has an Idea of Parts of Space, as well as my ſelf. To talk of any Thing's having Parts, whoſe Exiſtence we are not certain of, is abſurd; but ſurely it is more abſurd to talk of Something, and the Difference between that and ſome other Thing, and poſitively to apply Realities to it, and yet be convinc'd at the ſame Time, that it is Nothing. I ſhould be glad to ſee it made out, how we might with equal Truth ſay, "That "every Part of *Duration* exiſts at once, as "that every Part of Space exiſts at once." *pag.* 61. Our Author proceeds to anſwer the ſecond Difference, in the three following Pages. It would be of little Uſe to conſider all he has ſaid about it, ſince he allows the Dif-

Difference at the ſame Time that he is endeavouring to prove the contrary, "Becauſe "*Duration* has no relation to the *Bulk* of a "Body, whereas SPACE, *viz.* Extenſion, has." *pag.* 63. Yet he ſays, that this Difference is not from any Thing in themſelves, *viz.* in Space and Duration, but merely from the Bodies. If all this be true, if it is owing to the Bodies only, that Space has a relation to the Bulk of Bodies, and that Duration has not; whether it really is ſo, or not, I ſhall not now enquire, but only ſay, That he is in as great a Difficulty, for he is ſtill inconſiſtent with himſelf. He calls Space Nothing, and yet allows it to have a relation to Something. Can Nothing have a relation to Something? Surely our Author ſhould have prov'd that Nothing can have a relation to Something, and have ſhewn us what kind of a Relation it would be. He ſays a little lower, That "the Idea of *Duration*, "or *Exiſtence*, has no more to do with the "Idea of *Great* or *Small*, than it has with "the Idea of *Heavy* or *Light*: SPACE, indeed, and *Extenſion*, have relation to the "Greatneſs or Smallneſs of Bodies; but yet "this does not prove, that there is any *poſitive Difference exiſting between* or *in* "SPACE and Duration: It proves, if you "pleaſe, that SPACE is not Duration, nor "Duration SPACE, *&c.*" *pag.* 64. What is this but allowing the very Thing I want-

ed? If two Things are not one another, they cannot be a third; that is, if Space is not Duration, nor Duration Space, they can neither of them be Nothing, becauſe they would therefore be one another; unleſs this ingenious Author can tell the Difference between one Nothing and another Nothing, and ſhew that theſe two Nothings remain Nothing, after they are allow'd to be different from each other: If he can do this, then indeed he may call Space Nothing, and yet ſay, that it is not Duration, but different from it, though Duration be another Nothing.

To prove Space not a mere Idea, I produced an Argument from the Nature of the Idea of Space, which is Simple. To which our Author objects, *That it may be queſtion'd whether it be a Simple Idea, or a Complex Mode:* But this Matter was fully clear'd up in my *Second* Defence, *pag.* 24. and whoever conſiders that, will need but little Anſwer to all this Gentleman has ſaid upon it. He ſeems throughout his Reply to the foregoing Argument, to imagine, That we can have an Idea of Nothing from the Abſence of Something. He would have done well to have explain'd what ſort of an Idea, an Idea of Nothing is, and how we are to diſtinguiſh it from an Idea of Something; and as he thinks that ſimple Ideas may be Ideas of Nothings, he ſhould find out ſome new Way to prove that *Things* exiſt without us,

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and tell us how we are to know what Things are, and how they differ from each other. But I doubt, if ſimple Ideas can be Ideas of Nothing, we ſhall, as I ſaid in my ſecond Defence, find it very difficult to prove that any Thing at all exiſts without us.

I readily grant, that the Idea of Space is firſt got from Body, that is, the Idea of the Space or Extenſion of Body; but the Idea of Space itſelf, of the Space where there is no Body, has nothing at all to do with Body; it is got quite otherwiſe, it is from Space itſelf, without conſidering Body, becauſe we have an Idea of Space without Body. This plainly ſhews the Difference; for the Idea of Space, which is got from Body, and is the Extenſion of Body, is inſeparable from Body. If this Gentleman can prove, that we could never have had the Idea of Space without Body, ſuppoſing we had been only immaterial Beings, I ſhall willingly give up the Diſpute. I imagine, if we conſider it, that we ſhall find the contrary; for I believe there is no Abſurdity in conceiving that two Spirits, when they are in different Places, may have an Idea of the Diſtance that is between them, when there is no Bodies or Matter near them and from thence have an Idea of Space. This obviates what he ſays, *pag.* 66, 67. in anſwer to *pag.* 68. I refer the Reader to my ſecond Defence, *pag.* 25. I had inſtanc'd in Light's being a

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ſimple Idea; and that had Light never exiſted, we ſhould never have had ſuch an Idea. "Here, ſays he, he confounds the *Particles* "which *cauſe* the *Idea* of Light in us, and "the *Idea* of Light together: The *Thing* "from whence we have the Idea of Light "moſt certainly does exiſt: But what then? "Does it follow that no Perſon could ever "have had an Idea of Light, had *Light* "never exiſted? No Perſon could ever "have had an Idea of Light, had not the "*Particles* which *cauſe* that *Idea* exiſted; "but the Particles which *cauſe* the Idea "is not the *Idea itſelf*: the *Particles* exiſt "*ad extra*; but the *Idea* exiſts no where "but in the Mind." *Pag.* 69. I am ſorry this Author ſhould think me ſo abſurd, as to mean, when I ſaid, *Had Light never exiſted, no Perſon could have had an Idea of it*, that no Perſon could have had an Idea of Light, unleſs the Idea of Light had exiſted. By *Light* I meant the Particles which cauſe ſuch an Idea in us. How have I therefore confounded the *Particles* and the *Idea* together? He allows, that without the Exiſtence of theſe Particles, no Perſon could ever have had an Idea of Light; which is moſt certainly true. If then a Perſon has ſuch an Idea, does it not evidently follow, that the Particles which cauſe this Idea exiſt? This is all my Argument was brought to prove. The Difference between us in this

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Caſe is but little: It ſeems to me only this; He grants that the Idea of Space may be Simple, (a Complex Mode, as he elſewhere calls it, may be reduced to a Simple Idea:) He grants alſo, that had not that, which is the Cauſe or Foundation of this Idea, exiſted, we could not have had ſuch an Idea. The Queſtion therefore is, Whether this Idea is alone from Body, and dependent upon Body, in the ſame Manner as the Idea of Light is upon the Particles, which cauſe that Idea. The Caſe is very plain, we can by no means have an Idea of Light, without ſuppoſing the Particles of Light to exiſt; we cannot poſſibly ſeparate theſe from each other: But how eaſy is it to ſuppoſe *Space* without *Body*? Body is indeed inſeparable from *Space*, that is, it cannot exiſt without *Space*; but *Space* can, and does, exiſt without Body: But this we have had before. He tells us, *pag.* 70. "That we can ſay the ſame of "*Darkneſs*, as he does of *Light*." This is again running into the Notion of the Ideas of Abſences being the poſitive real Ideas of Nothings: The Idea of Darkneſs is an Idea of a Place, without the Particles which cauſe the Idea of Light, and not an Idea of the Abſence, and of nothing but the Abſence of Light: If it be, I deſire this Gentleman to ſhew me the Difference between the Ideas of the Abſence of a Houſe, and of the Abſence of Light.

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I ſhall not take Notice of all he has ſaid upon this Argument; but I cannot help asking this one Queſtion, the Occaſion of which is from his ſaying, that "we may "have a Simple Idea of that which does "not exiſt." How will he prove that any Thing exiſts without us? The Remainder of my Arguments, he has brought no Objections againſt; ſo that we are come to the Concluſion, which was this, That Space muſt therefore be Property. But this Notion, he ſays, is to be conſidered a little farther.

The Tranſlator had quoted a Paſſage from the critical Dictionary, in which it is ſaid, That if Space be a Mode, we are to define its Subſtance. To which I anſwer'd, That there was no ſuch Neceſſity for us to define its Subſtance, ſince we could not define the Subſtance of any Mode whatever: By the Word *Subſtance* I meant, as this Author underſtands me, the *Subſtratum*, that is, in his own Words, *Something beſides the* eſſential *and* conſtituent Properties. The Abſurdity of ſuppoſing *Subſtances* to be only all the *eſſential* or *conſtituent Properties* taken together, may be ſeen in my *Second Defence*, *Page* 5. It is very true, that if we know nothing at all of the Properties of Subſtance, or nothing about it, we cannot determine whether a particular Property can be applied to that Subſtance, or no. Thus, as our Author ſays, *Page* 74. that "unleſs we had ſome "Idea, ſome Notion of what we call *Mat-*

"*ter*,

"*ter*, we could not affirm any Thing to be "a Mode or Property of *Matter*." A little farther he tells us, that "We have no Idea, "no Notion at all of the Subſtance of "which SPACE is affirmed to be a Mode, "*viz.* of the ſelf-exiſtent Subſtance, or to "ſpeak more properly, of the ſelf-exiſtent "Being." How are this Author's Paſſages to be reconciled? By *Subſtance* he cannot mean the *Subſtatum*, becauſe he before told us, that "in that Senſe of *Subſtance*, "it was not neceſſary that the *Subſtance* of "a *Mode* ſhould be defined, before we could "tell whether it was a Mode, or no." *Page* 73. It is plain then, that he cannot mean that we muſt know the *Subſtratum* of the ſelf-exiſtent Being, before we can tell whether Space be a Property of that Being, or no. Now I take it for granted, that there is nothing in a Subſtance, beſides the *Subſtratum* and all the *Properties*; if then it is not neceſſary to know the *Subſtratum* of any Being, and it be nevertheleſs neceſſary to know ſomething of it, it can be only neceſſary to know ſome of the Properties; that it is not neceſſary to know all the Properties, is plain from his own Words, "That "there may be Properties of Matter, which "we known nothing of." *Page* 75. Will this Author ſay, that we know none of the Properties or Attributes of God? I ſuppoſe he grants that God is an omniſcient, om-

nipotent, eternal Being: How does he know that God is ſuch a Being? How can he prove Omniſcience, Omnipotence, and Eternity to be Properties of God? ſince, without knowing his Subſtance, (which, he ſays, we know nothing of,) we cannot tell whether they belong to him, or no: I ſhould be loth to entertain Principles, whoſe natural Conſequences lead ſo near Atheiſm, as theſe ſeem to do. After having ſaid that we may be able to judge whether any Property be a Property of Matter, or no, by our being ſo converſant with it, there follows this Paſſage: "But will any one preſume to ſay, that he "knows as much of the *ſelf-exiſtant Sub-* "*ſtance* as he does of *Matter?*" But I anſwer, Will any one preſume to ſay the contrary? The Knowlege of Matter can be nothing, without the Knowledge of its Exiſtence firſt; and can any Perſon ſay, that he is as ſure of the Exiſtence of Matter, or of any other Beings, except himſelf, as he is of the Exiſtence of God? Our Certainty of the Exiſtence of Matter depends upon our Senſes; and as it is not impoſſible to be deceived by our Senſes, our Knowledge of the real Exiſtence of Matter falls ſhort of our Knowledge of God; the Proof of whoſe Exiſtence ſo evidently follows from our own Exiſtence, independent of any or all our bodily Organs or Senſes, that we might almoſt as eaſily be deceived in the Truth

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and Reality of our own Exiſtence, as of the Exiſtence of the firſt Cauſe and Creator of all Things. To what purpoſe then does this Author talk in the Manner he does? *Page* 75. "But will any one preſume to "ſay he knows as much of the *ſelf-exiſtent* "*Subſtance*, as he does of Matter? Has he "as clear an Idea of GOD, as he has of "Man? He will not, in the Face of com-"mon Senſe and Reaſon, lay down ſuch a "Poſition; and therefore he cannot affirm "SPACE to be a *Mode* or *Property* of the "*ſelf-exiſtent Subſtance*, with the ſame Cer-"tainty and Aſſurance, as he may affirm any "Thing to be a *Mode* or *Property* of *Mat-*"*ter.*" If Space be a Property, and cannot be ſuppoſed not to exiſt, it is a neceſſarily exiſting Property. That it is a Property has been already proved; that it cannot be ſuppoſed away our Author allows: *See Pag.* 39, 40. in *Dr.* Clarke's *Notions of Space examined, &c.* Now no Property can exiſt of itſelf, without ſome Subſtance; but a neceſſarily exiſting Property cannot poſſibly belong to a contingent Subſtance: So that if there is (as there muſt be, elſe there could not be a neceſſarily exiſting Property) a neceſſarily exiſting Subſtance, it muſt be a Property of that Subſtance. Whether this is not as good and certain a Proof, that Space is a Property of the ſelf-exiſted Subſtance, as any he can bring to prove any Thing to

be a Property of Matter, I leave others to judge.

I ſhall not trouble the Reader with the three following Pages; for our Knowledge of the Properties of ſeparate Spirits, and of the Properties of God, are not to be conſidered together; for the Exiſtence of one we are demonſtrably certain of; but the other we are not. He ſays, *Pag.* 79. that "it may be worth while "to obſerve what Contradictions he runs into, "in talking upon this Point, which may ap- "pear by comparing *Page* 37, *&c.* and "Page 99. of the Defence together." The Words are theſe, Space *is the eſſential Property of the ſelf-exiſtent Being; therefore* Space *cannot exiſt without the ſelf-exiſtent Being, nor the ſelf-exiſtent Being without Space.* And then *Pag.* 99. I ſaid, That Duration *and* Space *were neceſſarily exiſting Properties, neceſſarily ſo in themſelves; whereas all the other divine Attributes, ſuch as* Wiſdom, Juſtice, Goodneſs, *and the like, were all neceſſary Properties, but not of themſelves; they were neceſſary, becauſe they were Properties of a* neceſſary Being. Could this Author imagine, or what Reaſon had he to think, I meant that thoſe Properties could exiſt of themſelves, ſeparate from and independent of the ſelf-exiſtent Subſtance; when I had through my whole Defence, always affirmed the contrary; namely, that no Property whatever could poſſibly exiſt

exiſt without ſome Subſtance? My Meaning was plainly, and only this, That we ſaw the Neceſſity of their Exiſtence; or that they were neceſſarily exiſting, without conſidering the Exiſtence of the Subſtance to which they belonged. I therefore think myſelf obliged to give no farther Anſwer to all the Abſurdities he would here charge me with. I aſſerted afterwards, *That when we found both* Space *and* Duration *not to be Subſtances, but Properties, we were neceſſarily led to ſuppoſe ſome Subſtance of which they were Properties.* "Here indeed, ſays he, he "does get out of his former Contradiction, but "it is by another; for he contradicts again "the very Thing he before ſaid." The Contradiction he here charges me with, is this, That I ſhould aſſert Space and Duration to be neceſſarily exiſting Properties, and yet ſay they cannot exiſt without ſome Subſtance, and therefore they cannot be neceſſarily exiſtent: But this will equally prove againſt the Self-exiſtence of the ſelf-exiſtent Being; for ſuch a Being cannot no more than other Beings exiſt without its eſſential Properties; and therefore, for the ſame Reaſon, it cannot be ſelf-exiſtent. That Properties ſhould be able to exiſt at all of themſelves, much leſs neceſſarily of themſelves, I never meant to ſay; but only that their Neceſſity might be perceived, without conſidering their *Subſtratum*; and not only ſo, but might

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lead us to perceive the Neceſſity of the *Subſtratum.* This is all I intended to ſay upon this Head. He concludes it with two Quotations, which are agreeable to his own Notion of Space; which, as we have had ſo much of it already, I ſhall paſs over, and proceed to vindicate the other Parts of my Defence, which this Gentleman has objected againſt.

AFTER having produced all the foregoing Arguments againſt the Reality of Space, he proceeds to examine two Notions I had laid down in my firſt Defence; the one concerning the Nature of Infinities, and the other about eternal Creation; both which, he ſays, *are ſo manifeſtly wrong, that it is almoſt impoſſible for any one to paſs them over, without ſeeing it; or to ſee it, without endeavouring to give ſome Anſwers.* I had aſſerted, That *a* poſitive *or* metaphyſical Infinite *certainly meant what was abſolutely* perfect; *that to which nothing could be added; but then this muſt always mean in the particular* Way *that it was infinite: For Inſtance, an infinite* Line *cannot be made longer or ſhorter, but it may be made broader, &c.* To this our Author replies, that "To ſay, that a Thing "is *abſolutely* perfect *one Way*, is hardly "Senſe; for *abſolute* Perfection implies *en-*"*tire* Perfection; Perfection every *Way*; "ſince nothing can be ſaid to be *perfect*, "if it be *any Way* imperfect." *Pag.* 87. To take much Notice of this, would be only

only to introduce a Diſpute about the Meaning of *abſolutely perfect*; which Words, I think, could not eaſily be miſunderſtood, when I ſo plainly told the Manner and Senſe I meant to uſe them in. However, I ſhall not contend about the ſtrict Propriety of the Expreſſion, but only ſay, That there is no Abſurdity in affirming that it is poſſible for a Thing to be Infinite and Finite at the ſame Time; for an Infinite Phyſical Line, a Line that is infinitely extended each Way, is infinite with reſpect to its Length, but finite with reſpect to its Breadth. Will this Author ſay, that ſuch a Line cannot be infinite in Length, without being infinite in Breadth? that is, an Infinite Line cannot be ſuch, without being an Infinite Surface? And for the ſame Reaſon we may ſay, that an Infinite Surface, cannot be ſuch a Surface without it be a Solid. If this be his Opinion, I ſhall not try to confute him. I alſo aſſerted, That a Line might be Infinite one Way, and Finite another; but ſays he, "That "which is *abſolutely Infinite*, is that to "which *Nothing can be added*; and *we may* "add to his Line above mention'd: *Ergo*, "that Line is not *abſolutely infinite*; for "the being able *to add to it* one Way, de-"ſtroys the ſuppos'd *Abſolute Infinity* of it." *pag.* 88. *That Way* he ſhould have added; for it does deſtroy the Infinity, if we ſuppoſe any Infinity there, of that Part of the Line

Line to which we add; but the Infinite Part of the Line remains the ſame, notwithſtanding any Increaſe or Diminution of the other Part of the Line. Now if the adding to this Line deſtroys only the Infinity, where neither I, nor any Perſon elſe, ever ſuppos'd any Infinity at all, what has this Gentleman proved? When a Line is ſaid to be Infinite one Way, and Infinite one Way only, it can be to no Purpoſe to talk of altering its Infinity, by adding to, or taking away from, the Finite Part of it. The Author ſeems to diſpute here merely upon the Meaning of Words, and not about the Nature of the Thing, as is evident from this next Paſſage; "That which is *abſolutely Infinite* has nei- "ther Beginning nor Ending." *pag.* 88. I ſhall therefore now go on to vindicate the Notion of the Poſſibility of Eternal Creation. I am fully ſatisfied, that all Objections, at leaſt, all I have ever met with, are founded upon our weak and inadequate Ideas of Infinite Duration paſt. Whether I have not ſufficiently prov'd the Contradiction implied on the other Side of the Queſtion, I leave to the Judgment of the impartial Reader: However, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew the Inſufficiency of what this Gentleman has ſaid to prove the contrary; which Proof is founded upon the Notion, That Creation implies a Beginning; and that Men are Created Beings, and therefore cannot exiſt from Eternity. In our

our Ideas, 'tis true, Creation does imply a Beginning; that is, we cannot conceive how a Being can be created without a Beginning. And what then? Does it from thence follow that what was created from Eternity muſt have had a Beginning? No ſure; it is no more a Conſequence than this, That becauſe we cannot conceive how an Eternity can be now paſt, therefore there is not an Eternity now paſt. The Caſe is exactly the ſame in each; for to ſuppoſe either of them impoſſible, is equally a Contradiction, and yet both of them are equally inconceivable; ſo that there needs no other Anſwer to this Section.

My Argument to prove the Poſſibility of Eternal Creation was this: *That ſince* God *exiſted himſelf from all Eternity, He could act from all Eternity; but Creation is an Action, therefore He could create from all Eternity.* "That God, ſays he, could act "from all Eternity, is moſt certainly true; "but then it muſt be taken in a *certain* "*Senſe*, otherwiſe it would not be true; "that is, that he could only act conſiſtent "with his own Nature, and where there "was no Contradiction implied in the Acti-"on: Whereas in *Creating from Eternity*, "there is a manifeſt Contradiction; for it is "cauſing thoſe to *exiſt from Eternity*, who "are yet ſuppos'd to *begin to exiſt*; where-"as whatever *exiſted from Eternity* could

" have no voluntary Cauſe of Exiſtence, " nor could *begin to exiſt*; and whatever " *begun* to exiſt, is ſuppos'd *once not to have* " *exiſted*; and therefore could not have *exiſted* " *from Eternity.*" *pag.* 89. Whatever implies a Contradiction, or is inconſiſtent with the Nature of GOD, He never could do at all. Our Author therefore endeavours to ſhew the Contradiction implied in Created Beings exiſting from Eternity: This is becauſe they are ſuppos'd to begin to exiſt. But this Suppoſition I deny: They are not ſuppos'd to begin to exiſt, nor will it follow that they are not Created Beings, if they did not begin to exiſt. However, ſuppoſe this Author had prov'd what he propos'd, what had he gain'd by it? For till he can ſhew that my Argument does not make it a plain Contradiction on the other Side, he will be juſt where he was; for if both Sides of a Propoſition can be reduced to a Contradiction, all that follows is, that neither of them can be true. But he has himſelf quoted a ſufficient Anſwer from my Firſt Defence, *pag.* 24. The Words are theſe; *If* GOD *could not create from all Eternity, then whenſoever, or at whatever Time it was, that He had the firſt Power of Creating, that Power had a Beginning; becauſe whatever was not from Eternity certainly had a Beginning: Now whatever began to exiſt, there was an Eternity* a parte ante, *before it did begin to exiſt;*

exiſt; for whatever had a Beginning, bears no Proportion to that which was from Eternity: So that God *exiſted a whole Eternity* a parte ante, *before he had the Power of Creating, that is, He was an Impotent Being a whole Eternity.* This is the Contradiction implied in ſuppoſing God not to have a Power of creating from all Eternity. This he endeavours to clear himſelf of, by a Diſtinction where I can find no Difference; a Diſtinction between a *Power from Eternity* of Creating, and a Power of *Creating from Eternity.* "That God, ſays he, had "in himſelf a *Power from all Eternity* of "creating whatſoever, and whenſoever he "pleas'd, is undoubtedly true:" (But I beg Leave to obſerve here, that this is undoubtedly inconſiſtent with his own Notion; for if God could create whenſoever he pleas'd, he could create from all Eternity, becauſe he could certainly pleaſe from all Eternity, otherwiſe he had no Free-will from Eternity.) "But that he had a Power of creating Be-"ings from all Eternity, *i. e.* that he had "a Power to *create Eternal Beings*, is un-"doubtedly falſe" *Pag.* 91. This then is the Diſtinction. Let us therefore try to find out the Difference between theſe two Propoſitions. Firſt he ſays, That it is undoubtedly true, that God had a Power of Creating from Eternity, or from Eternity of Creating; but then he had not the Power of Creating

Beings from Eternity. I ask then, To create what had he the Power from Eternity? I think he muſt anſwer, Nothing; for it is as poſſible to create Beings from Eternity, as any Thing elſe. If he had not the Power of creating any Thing at all from Eternity, what is the Difference between having, and not having, ſuch a Power? ſince though he has it from Eternity, he cannot exert it from Eternity? His Meaning therefore I think muſt be this; That though GOD had a Power from Eternity of Creating, and could alſo exert that Power from Eternity, yet the Effect conſequent upon this Exertion could not be from Eternity alſo, but muſt have a Beginning: Which Notion ſeems to be founded upon this, That the Cauſe muſt be *prior* to the Effect. Which that it muſt always be, I deny; and, as he himſelf ſays elſewhere, it is his Place to prove it, who is of the affirmative Side. That I have not miſtaken his Meaning, is plain from what follows, *Pag.* 92, 93. "The *Power of creating* Adam "GOD had from Eternity; but the Power "of *creating* Adam from *Eternity*, i. e. the "Power of cauſing *Adam* to have *exiſted* "*from Eternity*, who, by being ſuppos'd to be "*created*, is ſuppos'd to have had a *Beginning* of Exiſtence, GOD certainly had not, "nor poſſibly could have."—"The *Power* "*of Creating* muſt be *prior* to the *Thing* "*created*; and though this *Power* was in

"GOD

" God *from Eternity*, yet it does not fol-
" low that the *Effects*, the *Produce* of that
" Power, might have been from Eternity."
We ſee therefore that this is plainly his Notion, That had God exerted this Power from Eternity of Creating, from Eternity, the Being or Subſtance conſequent upon this Exertion would have had a Beginning, and therefore could not have been from Eternity. The Abſurdity of this Opinion is very clear and plain; for if God had exerted this Power from Eternity, and yet the Effect was not from Eternity, it is evident that there muſt be a whole Eternity paſs'd between the Exertion of the Power, and the Effect conſequent upon that Exertion; becauſe the Effect has a Beginning, and the Exertion of the Power has none. There are but two Ways to evade this, each of which will plunge him into equal Difficulties: The one is, to recant what he has granted, and ſay, That God had not the Power from Eternity of Creating, becauſe it was impoſſible. To which I reply, That God can create now; and therefore as it is poſſible now, and was not always poſſible, there was a Time that it chang'd from impoſſible to poſſible; which is to ſuppoſe a Change in God; which is abſurd and contradictory. The other is, That God had the Power; but could not exert it from Eternity: And then I deſire to know the Difference between having a Power from Eterni-

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ty, without being able to exert it from Eternity, and not having that Power from Eternity at all. "Whatever was *created*, ſays "he, did once *not exiſt.*" *Pag.* 93. This is true only in a certain Senſe, That whatever was *created in Time*, did once *not exiſt*; but that which was from Eternity, whether it was created, or not, did *never not exiſt.* Creation in Time, is a Mutation from Non-Entity to Entity; but that which was created from Eternity, never was *Nonens*, or not in being. "If they (Beings which were "created from Eternity) were exiſtent with "the Deity, and yet created by him; then "there would be Effects coeval with their "voluntary Cauſes; and there would likewiſe be ſeveral Beings exiſting from Eternity, all of whom would therefore be neceſſarily exiſting, *&c.*" *Pag.* 94. In anſwer to this, I beg this Author to prove, That a Cauſe muſt be *prior* to its Effect; let him ſhew the Abſurdity of ſuppoſing them coeval. As to the next Part of the Paſſage, I own I can ſee no Connection in any Part of it: I am ſure he has not yet ſhewn, That what was from Eternity, muſt therefore be neceſſarily exiſting. I ſuppoſe he will allow the material World not to be ſelf-exiſtent; yet how will he prove that it was not from Eternity? I imagine he will ſay with the reſt of that Side of the Queſtion, That it had a Beginning, and therefore could

not

not be from Eternity. But this is too abſurd an Anſwer to be made, ſince it is ſo evidently a begging the Queſtion. He ſays, "He "muſt confeſs it ſeems evident to him, that "it (the material World) muſt be either "*neceſſarily exiſting*, or *not eternal*; for "whatever exiſted from Eternity, had no-"thing *prior* to it, and conſequently could "have no voluntary Cauſe of its Exiſtence, "ſince the *Cauſe* muſt be *prior* to the *Ef-"fect*, &c." *Pag.* 94. This is plainly begging the Queſtion; for it yet remains to be prov'd, that a Cauſe muſt be *prior* to its Effect; and could he prove it, and could he from thence conclude, that the World could not poſſibly have been from Eternity, there would ſtill remain the forementioned Contradictions about the Power of GOD, which he could never get clear of.

I do not intend to trouble my Reader with any Thing in *Pag.* 95. the Whole of it depending upon a Cauſe being *prior* to its Effect, and muſt therefore ſtand or fall with it. I urg'd, that *Neceſſity of Exiſtence could be only where the Suppoſition of the Nonexiſtence of that Thing was a Contradiction; which every one ſees is not the Caſe of the Material World.* This he owns to be true at preſent; "But, anſwers he, every one "muſt ſee, that it would have been the Caſe "of the Material World, had the Mate-"rial World exiſted from Eternity: For "what

" what can be a greater Contradiction, than " to ſuppoſe that *not to exiſt*, which *did exiſt* " *from Eternity?* 'Tis plain then, that what- " ever exiſted from Eternity, muſt be neceſ- " ſarily exiſting." *Pag.* 96. If it cannot be prov'd impoſſible for the World to have exiſted from Eternity, no Man is ſure that it has not, and then every one ſees that it would not have been the Caſe; that is, every one ſees that it would then be no Contradiction to ſuppoſe it not to exiſt. Which of us have prov'd our Points, with reſpect to the Poſſibility of the Eternity of the World, I ſubmit to others. If he has not prov'd it impoſſible, where is the Contradiction of ſuppoſing that not to exiſt which was from Eternity? And how could he deſire to know a greater Contradiction than that which was no Contradiction at all? And with what Reaſon could he ſay, that it was thence plain, that whatever exiſted from Eternity, muſt be therefore neceſſarily exiſting?

Dr. *Clarke* mentions three Inſtances, to make the Caſe of Eternal Creation plainer; Light from the Sun, a Shadow from an interpos'd Body, and an Impreſſion from an impos'd Seal. Theſe our Author ſpends ſix Pages in endeavouring to confute. It would be endleſs to go through all he has ſaid; I ſhall only ſhew how far they are, or can be, underſtood to be parallel. Firſt, If the Sun had exiſted from Eternity, it would have emitted

emitted Light from Eternity. The Motion of Light not being inſtantaneous, makes a Difficulty which, perhaps, we could never get rid of, and which is all that can be ſaid againſt the Poſſibility of Created Beings exiſting from Eternity; but then this Difficulty is merely owing to our inadequate Ideas, to our weak Minds, which can never be able to underſtand how an Eternity can now be paſt: But this, and all Arguments againſt Eternal Creation, equally affect the Exiſtence and Power of God from Eternity. It is therefore plain from all that has been ſaid, that there is on one Side a direct Contradiction, and on the other Side only a Difficulty; and ſurely we know which is ſafeſt to be choſen. This Author ſeems to make Dr. *Clarke* mean, in the Inſtance of Light proceeding from the Sun, that the Inſtance is parallel to God's creating from Eternity, in its *Neceſſity;* that is, that becauſe he ſays Light *muſt* proceed from the Sun, therefore God *muſt* create from Eternity: Which is far from what the Doctor meant, as appears from his own Words; *For*, ſays he, *the Effects of that Will and Power* might be ſuppos'd *coeval to the Will and Power themſelves, in the ſame Manner as Light would eternally proceed from the Sun*, &c. Here he only ſays, *might* proceed, not *muſt* proceed. The Sun is indeed an inactive Lump of Matter, and therefore Light would proceed from it

independent of any Power in it: But GOD is a free, active Being; and therefore it depended upon his own Good-will and Pleaſure, whether any Effects at all, or at any Time, ſhould proceed from his Power. The Inſtance therefore was deſign'd to be parallel only in the Poſſibility of each, and not in the Certainty of either. He brings an Argument to prove, That had the Sun exiſted from Eternity, yet the Particles of Light could not have proceeded from it from Eternity. The Argument has the ſame Fallacy that Dr. *Bently*'s about Generations of Men had, namely, That the Particles of Light began to flow from the Sun; wherein is the Miſtake, for they never began to flow, they always did flow from the Sun. This Argument, were it concluſive, would prove alſo againſt Eternity paſt; for all Time that is now paſt, was once preſent; that is, there was a Beginning of Eternity paſt. The two other Inſtances, I think, are leſs parallel, becauſe they are not inſtantaneous; but they are ſo very near it, that they give us a very good Idea of the Poſſibility of the Thing. Things that are not inſtantaneous, ſuch as Generations of Men, might certainly have exiſted from all Eternity; otherwiſe there will be a Contradiction no way to be got rid of. There are, I muſt confeſs, Difficulties which I cannot clear up; but then I apprehend that they are purely owing to our imperfect Notions

of

of Eternity paſt, as I believe, whoever reads all this Gentleman has ſaid upon it, will ſee very plainly.

He takes notice, *Pag.* 103. of a Paſſage of mine, to which he gives the Name of a Riddle. The Words are theſe; *There is a Time to come, which never will be preſent; and there is a Time paſt which never was preſent.* There is no Abſurdity in ſaying, That all future Time is to come; and that all Time that has been, is paſt; for *to come*, means no more than *future:* Yet it is evident, that all future Time never will be preſent, any more than all Time that is now paſt was ever preſent: And I do not imagine that there is any more in ſaying, That there is *a Time to come*, than in ſaying, That *all Time is to come.* An Inſtance may make this ſomewhat plainer: Suppoſe a Man to move from any given Point directly forward, and to move on infinitely; it is plain, that there will be Space for him to go through for ever, and the Space which he is to go through will be before him; and as Space is infinite, there will be Space which he never will arrive at. *To come*, with reſpect to Time or Duration, means only the ſame as *before* in a Motion through Space; and *paſt*, with reſpect to Time or Duration, may be taken in the ſame Senſe as *behind* in a Motion through Space, ſuppoſing a Perſon to have mov'd *from* Infinity in Space. *To come*,

cannot, in the Manner we uſe it, ſignify what *will be*, one Time or other, preſent; for then it would follow, that there will be an End; namely, when all Time either is, or was preſent. The ſame is true with reſpect to *paſt*, which cannot mean *what was preſent*, becauſe if all Time was once preſent, there was a Beginning; namely, when all Time was either preſent or future. If then there is any Riddle in the foremention'd Propoſitions, it is, I apprehend, owing to the Language, and not to the Argument. "*Duration*, he ſays, is the *flowing* of No-"thing, unleſs it be the Ideas in our own "Minds, or of Created Beings, from whence "we have thoſe Ideas." *Pag.* 105. It is true, that our Idea of Duration is got from the Succeſſion or Flowing of the Ideas in our Minds; but then Duration is not that Idea, but the actual Flowing of the Exiſtence of ſome Subſtance, and not a mere abſtract Idea; for if we ſuppoſe all Created Beings away, we cannot but ſuppoſe *Duration*, or the Enduring of Something.

I had endeavour'd to ſhew, that it was more probable that GOD did create ſome Beings from Eternity, than that he did not. My Argument was this; That as GOD acts always upon ſome Ground or Reaſon, whatever that Ground was for his Creating, it was the ſame from Eternity that it was at any particular Time; becauſe, Firſt, as he is himſelf im-

immutable, every Thing muſt be the ſame to him from Eternity, as at a particular Time, excluſive of any external Cauſe: Secondly, Before the Exiſtence of any Thing but himſelf, if he ever did exiſt alone, there could be no external Cauſe to determine it either Ways. This he would reduce to a Contradiction, by ſaying, That I prove when God exiſted alone, that he created from Eternity; *i. e.* when he did exiſt alone, that he did not exiſt alone. If my Words muſt be thus underſtood, I confeſs, it is a plain Contradiction: But I dare ſay, there are but few beſides this Author, who take them in ſuch a Senſe. *Before the Exiſtence of any Thing but himſelf*, cannot be underſtood to mean, that he *muſt*, or *certainly did*, exiſt alone; but only, ſuppoſing he did exiſt alone, there can be ſuppos'd no Reaſon for one Time rather than another; and therefore, in all Probability, he never did exiſt alone, but always diſplay'd his Infinite Goodneſs in creating and beſtowing Pleaſure and Happineſs upon his Creatures.

VIN-

VINDICATION

OF THE

SECOND DEFENCE.

HAVING finiſh'd my Anſwer to the Objections of the Author of Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notions*, &c. againſt my Firſt Defence, I ſhall here proceed to vindicate my Second Defence, and anſwer what this Author has brought againſt it, who was miſtaken, if he expected to ſee in it Arguments clear'd up that were not objected againſt; or new Demonſtrations, where the old ones needed only to be put in a clearer Light; for new Arguments, new Proofs, can be expected from none but thoſe who oppoſe Truth, who, when driven from one Argument, fly to another: Whereas thoſe who endeavour to be of the Side of Truth, cannot want new Demonſtrations, nor are requir'd to do any Thing, but to ſhew the Strength of the old ones in different Lights, that they may by that Means be convincing to all. The Author of Dr. *Clarke*'s *Notions*, &c. begins his An-

Anſwer to my ſecond Defence with the Inſtance of the two Walls; of which ſo much has been ſaid already in the foregoing Vindication, that we ſhall not dwell upon it here. "The Con- "ſequence, that the *Tranſlator* calls a lame "one, he ſays, is this; *When two Things touch one another, there is nothing between them,* Ergo, *when there is nothing between two Things, they muſt touch.*" *Pag.* 112. Here is the ſame Fallacy as I took notice of before; for he ſhould have added, *Or there is no Difference between touching, and not touching.* He allows, that there is ſuch a Difference; but if in each Caſe there is nothing between two Things, that is, whether they touch, or do not touch, there is nothing between them, let him ſhew the Difference that he allows. If he will ſay, that nothing can conſtitute ſuch a Difference; if he will affirm Something of Nothing, it will be in vain to try to confute him. Now if Nothing cannot conſtitute a Difference between two Somethings; and if Space can conſtitute ſuch a Difference, as he grants it can; and if notwithſtanding this Space is not Something, I beg this Gentleman to tell me what it is. He ſays in the following Page, That "when we "ſpeak of Things being *diſtant*, we mean it "of ſome Relation or Accident in the Things "themſelves, and not in any extraneous Pro- "perty inhering in ſomething elſe, *&c.*" *Pag.* 113. That is, in plain Engliſh, the Diſtance

Diſtance that is between two Bodies, is not between them, but in them. If Diſtance is only an internal Accident or Relation of the Bodies between which it is, then without any internal Alteration of either of the Bodies, the Relation muſt continue the ſame: But a Body may be mov'd from one Place to another, without any internal Alteration; and therefore when the Bodies are mov'd either nearer or farther from each other, there is ſtill the ſame Relation between them as before, when there is a different Relation; that is, there is the ſame Relation, and not the ſame Relation, at the ſame Time. It cannot be here replied, that Motion alters an internal Relation, becauſe the Relation of both Bodies will be alter'd by the Motion of one of the Bodies only.

The four next Anſwers are already obviated in the Vindication of my firſt Defence.

I had ſaid, That the *Idea of* Space, *and of its actual Exiſtence, we could by no Means get rid of, &c.* "The Word *it*, here refers "to *Idea*: He means then, that the *Idea* "of the *actual Exiſtence* of Space will "remain, *&c.*" *Pag.* 115. Our Author here miſtakes; for *it* refers to *Space*; the actual remaining of which follows from the Impoſſibility of getting rid of the Idea of its real Exiſtence, that is, from the Contradiction implied in ſuppoſing it not to exiſt. Could we as eaſily get rid of the *Idea* of SPACE as of other Things, it would from hence follow

low, that Space was not neceſſarily exiſtent.

I aſſerted, That *if all the* Tranſlator *meant by an abſtract Idea was, that it could have no Subſiſtence of itſelf, I very readily granted pure Extenſion to be of the ſame Kind.* To this our Author replies, *Page* 116. " That I grant the Tranſlator rightly " to have compared it. --- *Ergo*, I grant my " own Objections to the Compariſon to be " vain and fruitleſs." If this Gentleman will own that he means no more by an Abſtract Idea, than what was mentioned of it before, I may very ſafely grant my own Arguments to be vain and fruitleſs; but, I dare ſay, there are no Perſons of either Side of the Queſtion, that define abſtract Ideas in that Manner: If they do, I deſire to know the Difference between Properties and abſtract Ideas: If they do differ, or only agree in one particular, namely, in having no Subſiſtence of themſelves, then the Compariſon is falſe.

I ſhall give no Anſwer to the Remainder of *Page* 116. till this Author has ſhewn the Abſurdity of Properties inherent in Properties.

" He grants, ſays he, that *all the Idea he* " *can get of the Infinity of Space, ariſes purely* " *from an Addition of finite Spaces*: That " is, that all the *Idea* he can get of the Infi- " nity of Space, is from being able to add " finite Spaces together, without finding a " Poſſibility of ſtopping any where. If then " all the *Idea* he can get of the Infinity of

" Space be of this *negative* Infinity; how does " he know, or how can he prove, that a *quite* " *different Sort of Infinity* belongs to it? *&c.*" *Page* 117. From the Argument in this Paſſage, nothing can be concluded more than this, that we have no Idea or Image in our Minds, of Infinity; and whoever aſſerted that we had any? Were Space not truly and poſitively Infinite, there muſt be a Poſſibility of ſtopping ſomewhere, when we add finite Spaces together; but as there is *no* Poſſibility of ſtopping any where, it is plain, that there is no End; becauſe if there was, it might be come at; and what has no End, is poſitively Infinite.

The next Section requires no Anſwer.

He tells us *Page* 119. that " Space is not " an *Idea* of a *real* Thing, but it is an *Ideal* " *Thing.*" And again, in the ſame Page, " Space is an *ideal* Thing." Whether this be the Caſe, or no, has been ſhewn in the foregoing Vindication of the two Demonſtrations of Space.

I ſaid, That I was for leaving it to the Reader's Judgment, whether he could not ſuppoſe a Line infinitely extended each Way; he replies, that " He is apt to think, he " [*the Reader*] will conclude, that every " Line ſuppoſed to be actually drawn out, " muſt be *finite*, muſt be bounded by its " *Points.*" Page 120. I ask then, What Points they are, that this Line muſt be bounded by? Cannot God create a Quantity

of

of Matter of any determinate Breadth and Thickneſs, that ſhould, as to its Length be infinite? If he can, that is ſuch a Line as I meant. If he cannot, it muſt be becauſe it is impoſſible, and then it will be a Contradiction; and if it be a Contradiction, I deſire this Author to ſhew it to be ſo. "What he "calls *Duration itſelf*, is nothing more "than an *Idea.*" And again, "*Duration* "*in the Abſtract*, is like Space, an *ideal* "Thing only." *Pag.* 120. Both theſe Propoſitions ought to have been proved. Space and Duration have both been proved to be Something in this and in my former Defences.

The Caſe of eternal Creation I have ſufficiently explained in the Vindication of my Firſt Defence. However, ſince this Author lays ſo much Streſs upon it, I ſhall endeavour to anſwer what he ſays in his four following Pages, in as ſhort a Manner as I can. "For, ſays he, the very Suppoſition "that God had a *Power* from Eternity to "*create*, or bring any Thing *into* Being, "implies, that what he had a *Power* to "*create*, or bring *into* Being, muſt be once "out of Being, *&c.*" *Page* 121. That is, in other Words, *The very Suppoſition that God had a* Power *from Eternity to* create, *implies, that He could not exert that Power from Eternity*, i. e. He had not that Power from Eternity. This is a Conſequence, which will always lay heavy upon thoſe

who are of this Gentleman's Side of the Queſtion, though what he has produced againſt it, are great Difficulties, but entirely owing to our Want of Capacity to receive the particular Manner how they came to be ſo; though nothing can be more evident than that they are ſo, becauſe worſe Difficulties, *viz.* direct Abſurdities and Contradictions follow from the contrary Suppoſitions.

He brings an Argument from a celebrated Author, *Page* 122. I ſhall only take Notice of ſome Defects I obſerved in it: "He had the "*Power* of *creating* all Things, whenſo-"ever he pleaſed;" but he exiſted a whole Eternity without being able to pleaſe, for all this wonderful Power: "For what was "*from Eternity*, that *always actually was in* "*Being*." This I grant to be true; but the following Propoſition is falſe, that "it "never depended upon the Will or Choice "of any other Being, as a Thing which "might, or might not be." This I ſay is falſe, and will remain ſo, till the Contradiction implied in the Suppoſition of the Impoſſibility of eternal Creation, be anſwered, or till there be ſhewn as evident a Contradiction on the other Side; and then both Sides will be true, and both falſe. Again, "What God *created* of his own Choice, "that did depend upon the Will or Choice "of him, as a Thing which might, or might "not be." This is alſo true; but the Conſequence

ſequence which he draws from it, which is, that "it therefore was not *always actually in Being*; and therefore what God "created of his own Choice, could not "exiſt from Eternity," is falſe, for the ſame Reaſon as the former; for from this Conſequence it follows, that God was a whole Eternity a Being without any Freedom or Choice at all. The Arguments quoted at the Bottom of this and the following Page, have the ſame Sort of Fallacy, and do not require any particular Anſwer.

I affirmed, that *To ſuppoſe God to have a Power at one Time, and not at another, was to ſuppoſe a* Change *in him; but to ſuppoſe him to* exert *that Power at one Time, and not at another, juſt as he pleaſes, did not ſuppoſe any Change at all, but in his Will; what my Principles will lead to farther, I did not ſee.* This he quotes from me; and then anſwers, "But I do; for his *Principle* is "this, and the whole reſts upon this Maxim, "*viz. That whatever God can once do, he* "*can always do; otherwiſe he becomes* "*veſted with new Power, and there is a* "Change *in the Deity.*" *Page* 123. If the Author here means by the Action of God, a mere Action, without any external Circumſtance relating to it; then I grant what he ſays to be true: But if he applies any external Circumſtance to it, as I doubt we ſhall find he does, then it is falſe, and moſt evidently

evidently ſo. Thus, in the firſt Caſe, it is plain and true, that if God ever could, or ever will be able to create, he can create now; or if he can now, he always could, and always will be able to create: To create therefore, here means only the ſimple Action of Creation. But in the ſecond Caſe, where the Action is not ſimple, but has ſome external Circumſtance applied to it, it is very often falſe; for it is plain, that the Circumſtance of Time will alter the Nature of a Thing, even with reſpect to the Power of God; that is, God cannot do that now, the Poſſibility of doing which depended upon a Time that is paſt. Thus, for Inſtance, God cannot now create a Being from Eternity, though he could from Eternity have created ſuch a Being; which is the Inſtance he himſelf brings: So neither can he now create a Being coeval with *Adam*, neither can he now make *Adam* not to have exiſted; becauſe what is once paſt, is in the very Nature of the Thing, beyond the Power of Omnipotence itſelf to recal. If this be conſidered and underſtood, we ſhall the more eaſily ſee the Fallacy of the following Argument. "It is certain, that God can *give* "*Beginning* to what was not: Therefore he "always had a Power of *giving Beginning* "to what was not; therefore Something "might *have a Beginning from all Eter-* '*nity, &c.*" *Page* 124. The Action of giving

giving Beginning depends entirely upon a Circumſtance of Time. It does not therefore follow, that becauſe God can give a Beginning now, that he always could; that ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, he could give a Beginning from Eternity; no, that is apparently abſurd; but creating from Eternity is not abſurd: Becauſe it is not giving a Beginning from Eternity, as this Gentleman would have it be, but only making a Being exiſt from Eternity; and therefore it is making a Being exiſt without Beginning. To ſhew the Truth of this, let us purſue the Argument as far as it will go. It is very plain and clear, that God had from Eternity a Power of Acting; but if he could not from Eternity exert that Power, it is evident that it is the ſame Thing as if he had not had ſuch a Power. If he could exert the Power of creating from Eternity, which this Author allows he could do, in ſaying, that *God could moſt certainly act from all Eternity;* unleſs he can ſhew the Difference between the Action of Creation being from Eternity, and any other Action from Eternity; then, I ſay, that as this Power was from Eternity, it was without Beginning; and ſince the Exertion of it might have been from Eternity too, he could have created without Beginning; and if he could have created without Beginning, created Beings might have exiſted without Beginning, that

is,

is, from Eternity. There is no *Medium*, no Stop to be made between this and God's having no Power, no Free Will, nor any Perfections at all from Eternity. For if created Beings muſt of Neceſſity have had a Beginning, the Action of which they are the Conſequence muſt alſo have had a Beginning; or the Cauſe muſt have been a whole Eternity in producing the Effect: And if the Action muſt have had a Beginning, the Power muſt alſo have had a Beginning; or elſe, as before, the Power would have been a whole Eternity a mere empty Name, and in Reality no Power at all. The Section at the Bottom of *Page* 124. is ſuch a mere Quibble, that I am almoſt aſhamed to take Notice of it; his Words are theſe: "It may be farther added, "that ſince GOD cannot *now* make an *Eter-* "*nal Creature*, therefore he never could." That is, becauſe GOD cannot now create a Being that ſome thouſand Years ago ſhould have liv'd with *Adam* in Paradiſe, therefore he never could: Or, in plain Engliſh, unleſs GOD can make the preſent Time be the Time that is paſt, that is, unleſs he can do what is a Contradiction, he could not always do what he can now do. The Maxim, as he has put it, is his own; and as it is falſe, he is conſequently miſled by it. It ſhould have been put thus; That *what* GOD *can now do, he could always do;* and not as this Author has chang'd

chang'd it, That *what* God *could once do, he can always do:* Which, unleſs it meant only the bare Action, without any other Circumſtance, is not true; for we all know, that there are particular Circumſtances of Time and Things paſt, which make that impoſſible at one Time, which was poſſible at another. This is all the Reader will meet with here of the Poſſibility of Eternal Creation. I had never endeavour'd to advance any ſuch Notion, which appears ſo difficult to a great many Perſons, but upon the Occaſion I did, which was for a ſtronger Confutation of Atheiſm; which, as its Profeſſors now defend it, cannot, that I know of, be confuted any other Way; as was ſhewn in the Concluſion of my Second Defence.

He proceeds in this Manner, " We cannot " have any *poſitive* Idea of Infinite Space, " either in Imagination or Intellect." *Pag.* 125. This is moſt manifeſtly falſe; for if we cannot have any Idea of it in Intellect, if we cannot know whether it be Infinite, or no; for the ſame Reaſon we cannot know any Thing at all about the Divine Attributes: So that it would be but in vain for any Perſon to try to demonſtrate the Infinite Perfections of God.

It will be very needleſs to repeat all our Author has ſaid in the two following Pages, about the Diſtinction between *having diviſible Parts*, and *being extended*. He endea-

vours, I ſuppoſe, to maintain the Notion of the Soul's being an unextended Subſtance. I had, in my Firſt Defence, an Argument to prove it extended; he ſhould, I think, have anſwer'd that Argument, or elſe the Difficulties he would put upon this Diſtinction, will be but of little Force. My Notion of the Soul is this; That it is an extended, uniform, immaterial Subſtance, endued with a Capacity of Thinking, which is given to the Whole Subſtance; ſo that the Whole perceives, the Whole thinks, and not any Part of it, or all the Parts by themſelves. That it is indiviſible, as a thinking Subſtance, I firmly believe; but as an immaterial Subſtance it may, for what I know, be diviſible. The Difference between ſuch a Subſtance and Matter is, that the one has ſuch an indiviſible Property given to it, that the Diviſion of it would deſtroy its very Eſſence: Whereas Matter has no ſuch Property, nor can have ſuch a Property; for the Soul is a *Continuum*, or one uniform Thing; but Matter is actually divided, and compos'd of an infinite Number of diſtinct Subſtances; and whilſt it continues ſo, cannot have an indiviſible Quality fix'd to it: And herein conſiſts the Difference between their Extenſions. Why then does this Author talk of *all our Notion of* Extenſion *being taken from* Matter, when (though we do in deed get the Notion of it firſt from Matter,) we can conceive Extenſion where there is no Matter,

Matter, and therefore muſt conceive it to belong to ſomething elſe?

To ſuppoſe God *to be extended*, he ſays, *Pag.* 128. *is a very groſs Notion.* The apparent Groſſneſs of it ariſes from hence, That we are apt to connect Extenſion with Body or Matter; and ſo conclude, that whatever is extended, is therefore *material* or *corporeal.* But this is chiefly owing to the Prevalence of Carteſianiſm; as appears from hence, that if we put any other Word for Extenſion that has the ſame Meaning, as Expanſion, ſuppoſe, the Groſſneſs immediately vaniſhes. Taking therefore the Word Extenſion in ſuch a Senſe, I ſhould be glad to ſee what better Notion this Gentleman has of him. "But, ſays he, "though we ſhould ſuppoſe this, yet then "it cannot be prov'd, that what we call "SPACE is *his Extenſion*, or any Extenſion, "(except imaginary;) it muſt be itſelf extended, if it be any Thing, and muſt be the "*Subject* of *Extenſion*, not *Extenſion*." *Pag.* 128. Space is a Property, and ſuch a Property as can belong to no Subſtance, but the Supreme Being; it is the Extenſion or Expanſion of that Being. *Extended Extenſion*, and *the Space of* God's *Subſtance*, being Nonſenſe, or Soleciſm and Impropriety, is only owing to the Nature of the Language; for it is by no means Nonſenſe to ſay, that the Subſtance of God fills and conſtitutes Space,

Space; and yet theſe Words mean the ſame as *the Space of* GOD's *Subſtance.*

"We may have ſimple Ideas, which have "no external Objects correſpondent to them." *Pag.* 129. This we have before conſider'd; and to which I anſwer again, That if we can have ſimple Ideas from Nothing, we cannot be ſure of the Exiſtence of any Thing.

The two following Pages have been ſufficiently anſwer'd in the Vindication of the firſt Defence.

He tells us, *Pag.* 131. that "When we "ſuppoſe the Bodies away, we are apt to ap- "ply their Dimenſions to that imaginary "Part of Space, where we conſider'd them "before exiſting." What is this, but ſaying, That nothing exiſts but in Imagination; for if Bodies exiſt only in ſome imaginary Place, they cannot really and truly exiſt at all. How will he prove that they really do exiſt? He muſt either ſay, That they exiſt in ſome real Place; and then he agrees with us; or elſe he muſt ſay, That they make an imaginary Place become a real Place, by their exiſting in it; that is, the Place is ſometimes real, and ſometimes imaginary. This is too weak to be farther inſiſted upon.

His laſt Anſwer depends upon the Caſe of Eternal Creation, which we have before twice treated of, to which Places therefore I refer the Reader.

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FINIS.